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HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ARISING FROM
CONDUCT OF NON-STATE ACTORS
Jan Arno Hessbruegge*

INTRODUCTION

From their humble beginnings in the Magna Carta of 1215 to their
official birth in the Diclarationdes droits de l'homme et du citoyen of 1789

and thereafter, human rights movements concerned themselves with curbing
abuses by powerful states and their rulers. Today, states increasingly share
their power with international organizations and, perhaps even more importantly, with non-state actors. It has been argued that the end of the Cold
War not only shifted the balance of power between states, but had wider
repercussions on the order created by the 1648 Peace of Westphalia - an
order which designated the state to be the primary source of power in international politics and law.' This wider power shift can be characterized as a
"medievalization" of international relations. The Westphalian order, consisting of one layer of states, is increasingly replaced by a multi-layered
system similar to the feudalist medieval European empires, in which power
was distributed among various layers of noblemen with the emperor having
only partial control over his lands. 2 Multinational corporations, strengthened by free trade and privatization, achieve annual turnovers that dwarf the
gross domestic product of transitional and smaller developed countries 3 and
are capable of abusing their economic power. Transnational networks of
* Associate Human Rights Officer, United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights. First Legal State Exam 2002, University of Muenster, Germany;
MALD 2004, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The author would like
to thank Professor John Packer, Professor Hurst Hannum, and Ms. Lea Bishop for
their valuable comments on draft versions of this paper. Furthermore, I am grateful
to the universally gifted Ms. Angie Brice for her thorough review of the final draft.
The paper takes into account jurisprudence and literature published before April
2005. All views in this paper are those of the author in his personal capacity.
I Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76.1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 50 (1997).
2
Id. at 61.
3 According to a 2000 study comparing corporate sales and country gross domestic products, 51 of the 100 largest economies in the world are corporations and only

49 are countries. "General Motors is now bigger than Denmark; DaimlerChrysler
is bigger than Poland; Royal Dutch/Shell is bigger than Venezuela; IBM is bigger
than Singapore; and Sony is bigger than Pakistan." SARAH ANDERSON & JOHN
CAVANAGH, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES,
GLOBAL POWER

pdf.

Top 200:

THE RISE OF CORPORATE

3 (2000), available at http://www.ips-dc.org/downloads/Top200.
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non-governmental organizations (NGOs) force countries to adopt new rules
of international law such as those embodied in the Ottawa Treaty against
Landmines. 4 Armed non-state groups control territory that failed states left
for the taking. Transnational mercenary firms combine the power flowing
from the barrel of a gun with their business muscle. 5
The most startling and horrifying assertion of power by a non-state
actor in recent times, the attacks of September 11, 2001, have caused states
to attempt to reassert their power against international organizations and
non-state actors. Yet, it is uncertain whether this attempt will be successful.
After all, in reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States
once again enlisted non-state actors - the various factions known as the
Northern Alliance - to conduct the ground operations against the Taliban
government and Al-Quaeda in Afghanistan. This "outsourcing" of war into
the non-state realm has continued in Iraq, where some tasks that have traditionally been the prerogative of the military are now being fulfilled by private entities contracted by the Pentagon.
This paper addresses the issue of whether, and to what extent, the
conduct of non-state actors (i.e. their actions or omissions) may give rise to
violations of international human rights law as it presently stands. 6 As it is
used in this paper, the term "non-state actor" refers to all actors operating at
a sub-state or transnational level: individuals, corporations, armed groups
(e.g. insurrectional movements) and other organized entities, with the exception of intergovernmental organizations. 7 The issue addressed by this
paper is not a new one, but harkens back to the historical origins of human
rights. After all, one of the first popular human rights movements was the
anti-slavery movement, which strived against the holding and trading of
human beings by private persons. Another powerful transnational humanitarian movement of the early 19th century was directed against the societal
practice of Suttee (or Sati), according to which Indian widows were exConvention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507.
5 Cf. Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private Interna4

tional Security Companies, InternationalLaw, and the New World Disorder, 34
STAN. J. INT'L L. 75 (1998).

For models outlining how human rights ought to address non-state actors de
lege ferenda, see, e.g., David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The
6

Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International
Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 931 (2004).

The question of whether international intergovernmental organizations have
human rights responsibilities (e.g. when conducting peacekeeping missions) is of
great practical relevance but beyond the scope of this paper.
7
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pected to commit suicide by throwing themselves on their husbands' burning funeral pyres. Today, the continuing shift of power into the non-state
sphere makes the issue of how the actions of those within that sphere will
be treated, one of the most critical human rights matters of our time.
An example may illustrate the various facets of the issue. A United
Nations (UN) report of 2002 found that the Northern Alliance used child
soldiers to conduct their armed operations against the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan.8 Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) grants every child the "right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family,
society and the State." 9 Such measures include an obligation "to ensure that
children do not take a direct part in armed conflicts." 10 Has international
human rights law therefore been breached? If it has been breached, by
whom? Has it been breached by the United States, a party to the ICCPR,
because the United States supported and collaborated with the Northern Alliance in the military campaign against the Taliban regime? Perhaps the
state of Afghanistan, also a party to the ICCPR, breached it because Northern Alliance leaders now occupy positions in the new government of Afghanistan? Did the Northern Alliance factions themselves (or their
individual members) breach human rights law because they form part of
Afghanistan's society, which is also addressed by ICCPR Article 24?
Would anything change if any of the said states had been a party to
the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on The Rights of the Child on
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict? The Protocol not only
outlaws the use of child soldiers by states, but also sets forth in Article 4:
1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of
a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or
use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent
such recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal

The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on Children and
Armed Conflict, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. No. S/2002/1299 (Nov.
8

26, 2002).
9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at art. 24, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
10 Compilation of General Comments and GeneralRecommendations Adopted by

Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Int'l Human Rights Instruments, at Gen. Cmt. 17 3,
U.N. Doc. HR/GEN/l/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994).
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measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such
practices.I'

Part I of this paper discusses whether non-state actors themselves
are bound by human rights law. While the texts of existing major human
rights treaties generally do not create direct obligations for non-state actors,
such obligations are emerging in international customary law for armed
groups serving as the de facto governing body in a territory and for nonstate actors that become complicit in states' human rights violations. In
addition, the conduct of supposed "private" actors can be attributed to a
state, and thus give rise to human rights violations, more often than one
would expect (Part II.1). Furthermore, states have an obligation to protect
individuals and groups from other non-state actors with due diligence, by
preventing or at least reacting to certain non-state conduct (Part 11.2). These
diagonal obligations on states must be distinguished from true horizontal
obligations between non-state actors, but they can produce equivalent results, provided that states remain capable of fulfilling them.
While the existence of these diagonal obligations is now generally
accepted, international jurisprudence has not yet developed a formula that
clarifies which human rights give rise to diagonal obligations. This paper
seeks to fill this jurisprudential gap by introducing a distinction between
existential and social goods rights. The state may not consciously abstain
from protecting existential human rights against private harm unless there
are countervailing rights that must be respected. Conversely, human rights
guaranteeing access to social goods, and fair distribution thereof, only have
to be protected against some forms of non-state conduct, because a free
society accepts and is based on competition for social goods.
It should be noted that this paper deals with human rights law and,
to a lesser extent, with international criminal law, but not with international
humanitarian law (or the law of armed conflict, as it is also known), which
has long accepted that non-state actors have obligations towards individuals. International humanitarian law must not be mistaken for a human
rights law of armed conflict. Whereas human rights law derives its philosophical justification from the rights holder's qualities as a human being,
humanitarian law results from expectations of chivalry and humane compassion leveled against the duty holder. Even though human rights values
I Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution
and Child Pornography, May 16, 2000, art. 4, 39 I.L.M. 1285, 1288 [hereinafter
Convention on the Rights of the Child in the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict].
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increasingly permeate international humanitarian law, 12 crucial differences
continue to exist. Whereas human rights law is universal, for instance, the
protection offered by international humanitarian law is generally limited to
the opponent's soldiers and civilians.
I. NON-STATE ACTORS AS DUTY-HOLDERS IN INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
In the public discourse, a variety of actors are routinely branded as
human rights violators: dictators, exploitative transnational corporations,
terrorist groups and abusive husbands, to name a few. Yet, are any or all of
these non-state actors actually capable of violating human rights law? Who
is bound by international human rights law?
A.

The JurisprudentialDebate

In the human rights context, three dimensions of rights-duty relationships can be imagined:
* Vertical Obligations: The state (S) has an obligation to do or not
to do X in its dealings with a non-state actor (N), because N can
invoke a human right against S.
* Diagonal Obligations: The state has an obligation to protect one
non-state actor (NI), ensuring that another non-state actor (N 2)
does or does not do X to N1, because N, can invoke a human right
against the state.
" Horizontal Obligations: N1 must do or not do X to N2, because
3
N 2 has a human right corresponding to an obligation of N1.1
Vertical Obligation

DiagonalObligation

FHorizontalObligation

Human rights have primarily been associated with the first dimension of
vertical obligations, probably because they were first publicly promulgated
See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 239 (2000).
13 Brice Dickson, The Horizontal Application of Human Rights Law, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 59, 59-60 (Angela Hegarty & Siobhan Leonard eds., 1999).
12
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against the backdrop of struggles against oppressive states. The French
Diclarationdes droits de l'homme et du citoyen was a reaction to the absolutism of the anc(en regime. The mentioning of "unalienable Rights" in the
American Declaration of Independence 14 was an expression of the desire to
build a country that distinguished itself from the oppressive, colonial rule of
the British monarchy.
Raday notes that states are singled out as the addressee of human
rights obligations because of the absolute socio-economic and legal power
they wield over the individual in the absence of legal restraints.' 5 This
power stems from the state's authority to make binding law. Ostensibly,
some non-state actors (e.g. certain trade associations or international sports
federations) also engage in practices of norm-setting. However, state law
distinguishes itself from these practices in that it is ultimately backed up by
the legitimate use of factual power. The individual is subjected to the
state's power by way of legal sanction regardless of his consent. The state
courts are the first and only jurisdiction which have legal authority to check
the use of state power. On the other hand, private socio-economic power is
subject to additional mechanisms of legal control, even where it is factually
overwhelming. As a result, the balance of power between the state and the
individual is, by definition, predetermined, whereas the balance of power
between non-state actors is subject to change. 16 Today's bully might become tomorrow's victim.
The state's authority to make binding law also puts it in a unique
position, because it can generate revenue by levying taxes and other fees.
This allows the state to obtain the resources needed to fulfill cost-intensive
human rights obligations, such as guaranteeing socio-economic rights or the
right to a fair trial. The state can also use its taxing power to influence
areas of life that are generally intractable to legal commands (social attitudes, for instance), by redistributing resources from disfavored to favored
causes or groups without a cost to the state itself.
Critics of the human rights orthodoxy would like to see that human
rights are also applied horizontally between non-state actors, turning them
into human rights duty holders (in addition to the state). They point out the
enormous power that certain non-state actors have accumulated. They argue that the individual deserves to be protected from such power as much as
from the power of the state. 17 Feminist critiques sharpen this point by argu14

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.

2 (U.S. 1776).

Frances Raday, PrivatisingHuman Rights and the Abuse of Power, 13
L. & JuRis. 103, 108-10 (2000).
16 Id. at 109.
17 See, e.g., Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 6, at 933.
15

CAN.

J.
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ing that the state/non-state divide is based on gender bias. 18 It is argued that
the "men's sphere" is the public world, while the "women's sphere" tends
to be the private world of family and domestic life. In the men's sphere
human rights apply; in the women's sphere they do not. A solely vertical
application of human rights protects men that suffer state-sponsored torture,
while it does not protect women that endure equally horrendous suffering in
the form of domestic violence.
In addition, it is argued that state functions are becoming increasingly dispersed and shifted to the non-state sector, which makes it hard to
draw the line between state and non-state actions. 19 However, recognizing
the applicability of human rights to non-state actors does not solve the distinction problem. A denial of a human right by the state is always an act of
oppression, because the state's absolute power is abused. Conversely, the
frustration of human rights-relevant behavior by a non-state act does not
necessarily constitute an abuse. It will depend on the distribution of power
between the actors. If the goal of horizontal application is to check the
accumulated socio-economic power of private actors, rather than to simply
create rules of mutual self-restraint between private individuals, then one
has to analyze the power relationship and determine whether one side's
autonomy is threatened. The legal analysis is completely different than in
the state-individual relationship, in which the power relationship is predetermined. 20 Hence, one still has to determine what belongs to the non-state
sphere and what belongs to the state sphere.
A compromise between both viewpoints is the concept of diagonal
obligations. Rather than creating direct obligations between non-state actors, diagonal obligations require states to protect one non-state actor from
another in certain situations. It has been argued that this approach would be
ineffective because its indirect nature makes the legal process too time consuming.2 1 Others argue that states retain too great a margin of appreciation
under the diagonal approach. 22 The latter, however, is actually an argument
in favor of opting for the diagonal approach in the international context.
See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL
CHALLENGE 21 (K. E. Mahoney & P. Mahoney eds., 1993).
19 Dickson, supra note 13, at 67-70; see also ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS
18

IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 126-29 (1993).
20 Raday, supra note 15, at 109-10.

Jean-Franqois Gaudreault-DesBiens, Identitarisationdu droit et perspectivisme
dpistemologique: Quelques jalons pour une saisie juridique complexe de
l'identitaire, 13 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 33, 62-67 (2000).
22 Id. at 66.
21
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The purpose of international human rights treaties is not to limit a state's
policy choices, but to ensure that the policy eventually chosen still allows
the individual to enjoy his basic freedoms and rights. Both horizontal and
diagonal obligations are ultimately aimed at regulating relations in the nonstate sphere. However, diagonal obligations leave it up to each state to
choose how to fulfill its obligation. Different states may make different
choices. International human rights norms may be directly applicable to
individuals under one state's domestic law, while another state may decide
that the values embodied in international human rights should guide courts
when interpreting norms of private law. 23 Finally, a state can take the view
that human rights norms do not affect obligations between non-state actors
at all and instead fulfill its international obligations by adopting domestic
statutes of a protective nature. International law ought to respect these different choices to the extent that states prove capable of fulfilling their diagonal obligations.
B.

The Positive Law

International law permits the creation of binding human rights obligations for non-state actors. It is sometimes contended that individuals or
corporations are not subjects of international law and therefore unable to
bear rights or obligations in international law. Yet, this argument is putting
the cart before the horse. Subject status results from rights and duties under
international law, not vice versa. International intergovernmental organizations are limited subjects of international law. They have limited subject
status because their competence extends only as far as their express or implied powers. 24 By the same token, individuals and corporations attain partial subject status to the extent that international law endows them with
rights or duties. An abstract study of whether a certain non-state actor is a
The German Constitutional Court embraces this idea when considering the effect of constitutional rights on relations between non-state actors (the concept of
mittelbare Drittwirkung). The jurisprudence has its origins in the Liith Decision, 7
23

BVerfGE 198 (1958). Cf. Ralf Brinktrine, The HorizontalEffect of Human Rights
in German Constitutional Law, 6 EuR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 421 (2001); Basil
Markesinis, Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the Horizontal Effect of the
Human Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany, 115 L. Q. REV. 47 (1999); Peter E.
Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German ConstitutionalTheory, 48 MD. L.
REV. 247 (1989).
24
Cf. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996

ICJ 93,

25 (July 8).
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subject of international law, before moving on to explore the non-state ac25
tors specific obligations, is therefore redundant.
The Nuremberg Judgment authoritatively affirmed that the individual can and does have duties under international law:
[T]hat international law imposes duties and liabilities upon
individuals as well as upon States has long been recognized
Crimes against international law are committed by
....
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of in26
ternational law be enforced.
States are capable of creating such duties by way of an inter-state treaty that
does not require the consent of the non-state actor. 27 These obligations can
not only be created for individuals, but also for group entities. Conventions
on international maritime law, for instance, create such obligations for owners of ships. 28 International humanitarian law places duties on certain

25

But see, e.g.,

NICOLA

M.C.P.

JAGERS, CORPORATE HuMAN RIGHTS OBLIGA-

IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY 19-33 (2002); Surya Deva, Human Rights
Violations by Multinational Corporations and International Law: Where From
Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2003). Cf Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 6, at 944TIONS:

46.
Principles of InternationalLaw Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, at principle I, 99, 2
Y.B. of the Int'l Law Comm'n 374, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950). See also InternationalMilitary Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
26

173, 220 (1947).
Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, 1958 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115. See also STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S.
27

ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILrrY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 15 (2d ed. 2001); INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HuMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE
DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 57 (2002), avail-

able at http://www.ichrp.org/ac/excerpts/41.pdf.
COUNTABILITY

OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS

Cf LIESBETH ZEGVELD, AcIN INTERNATIONAL

LAW

14-18

(2002).
28 See Protocolof 1992 to Amend The InternationalConvention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, art. 4, 1969, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF. 9/15, Nov. 27,
1992, available at http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/protocivilpol1992.

html.
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armed groups, namely through Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.29
That there are no legal obstacles to the formation of horizontal
human rights obligations does not mean, however, that such obligations do,
in fact, exist. Apart from a few exceptions, human rights treaty law does
not recognize horizontal human rights obligations for non-state actors.
More significant exceptions emerge in customary human rights law. In addition, a framework of quasi human rights obligations is forming on the
basis of international criminal law.
1.

Horizontal Obligations Contained in Human Rights Conventions

Human rights conventions contain few horizontal obligations between non-state actors. Article 28 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights requires that "[e]very individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination, and to maintain
relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect
and tolerance. ' 30 Article 20 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child imposes duties on parents towards their children. 31 ICCPR
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. See also Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 1.1, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M.
1442; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict art. 19, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. Certain norms of international
humanitarian law can even be violated by non-state actors that are not armed. See
United States v. Krauch (the "I.G. Farben Case"), 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
29

BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW

No. 10, at 1132-33 (1952), available at http://www.mazal.org/NMT-HOME.htm.
30 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 28, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/
67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
31 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 20
1, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (July 1, 1990).
Parents or other persons responsible for the child shall have the
primary responsibility of the upbringing and development [of] the
child and shall have the duty:
(a) to ensure that the best interests of the child are their basic
concern at all times;
(b) to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, conditions of living necessary to the child's development; and
(c) to ensure that domestic discipline is administered with humanity and in a manner consistent with the inherent dignity
of the child.
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32
Article 24 is arguably another example.
Article 4(1) of the Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, which constitutes somewhat of a hybrid between a humanitarian and
human rights law norm, has already been mentioned. 33 The wording - stat-

ing that armed groups "should not .

.

. recruit or use" children in armed

conflict 34 - leads one to wonder whether the provision creates a binding
prohibition. The travaux priparatoiresreveal that the ambiguity was intended. Some speakers argued that an inter-state treaty could not bind nonstate parties. 35 However, a proposal to relegate the issue to the preamble
was rejected. 36 It would suit the humanitarian object and purpose of the

treaty if the prohibition was interpreted to be binding on non-state actors,
especially since the Protocol's preamble "recognizes the responsibilities" of
armed non-state groups and condemns "with the gravest concern the re37
cruitment, training and use" of children by such groups.
Beyond such isolated examples, treaty-based human rights law, as
embodied in the six main international conventions and the three major regional treaties, does not create horizontal obligations between non-state actors. The wording of the treaties is unequivocal. State parties "respect,"
"ensure," "take steps toward achieving," and "undertake" human rights obligations. 38 That is not to say that human rights treaties do not affect relaId.
ICCPR, supra note 9.
33 See Convention on the Rights of the Child in the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
32

34

Id.

35 Report of the Working Group on a Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention

on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts on its

Sixth Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Agenda Item
13, [ 37, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/74 (Mar. 27, 2000).
37

Id. 38.
Id. Annex, at pmbl. para. 11.

38

See ICCPR, supra note 9, at arts. 2-3; International Covenant on Economic,

36

Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (hereinafter ICESCR]; International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res.
2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965) [hereinafter CERD]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No.
46, at art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) [hereinafter CEDAW]; Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A.
Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at art. 2, U.N. Doc. A139/51
(1984) [hereinafter CAT]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25,
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tions in the non-state sphere. They clearly do, since they create diagonal
obligations.3 9 But the treaty obligations themselves are only owed by
states. A General Comment by the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights underscores the difference between a state's legal obligations under international human rights law and consequential indirect responsibilities of non-state actors: "While only States are parties to the
Covenant and are thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all
members of society - individuals, families, local communities, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, as well as the private business sector - have responsibilities in the realization of the right to adequate
food." 40 Some authors overlook this subtle but important distinction when
they wrongly conclude from jurisprudence recognizing diagonal obligations
of states, that non-state actors themselves have horizontal human rights obligations. Clapham, for instance, has suggested that the European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR) establishes direct obligations between
individuals. 4 1 The fact, he argues, that the Convention only provides for an
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (1989);
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; Organization of
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 30 at art. 1. But see JAGERS, supra note 25,
at 246-47; KATJA WIESBROCK, INTERNATIONALER SCHUTZ DER MENSCHENRECHTE
VOR VERLETZUNGEN DURCH PRIVATE 81 (1999) (both arguing that the wording and

context do not stand in the way of interpreting the treaties as containing horizontal
obligations). Spielmann has suggested that naming states in these norms may be
interpreted as a mere reference to the fact that states have been the treaties' authors.
DEAN SPIELMANN, L'EFFET POTENTIEL DE LA CONVENTION EUROPEENNE DES DROITS

41 (1995). However, such a passing reference would have been included in the preamble rather than in a major substantive
provision.
39 See infra notes 194-282 and accompanying text.
40 Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the InternationalCovenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11),
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, at Gen. Cmt. 12 [20, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/
1999/5 (May 12, 1999). Cf.The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed
on States Parties to the Covenant, Human Rights Comm., at Gen. Cmt. 31 8,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) ("The article 2, paragraph 1,
obligations are binding on States [Parties] and do not, as such, have direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law.") (emphasis added).
41
CLAPHAM, supra note 19, at 89-133. Professor Clapham has reaffirmed this
position for human rights law in general in his course entitled Human Rights ObliDE L'HOMME ENTRE PERSONNES PRIVtES
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action of individuals against states and not against other individuals (see
ECHR Article 25) does not preclude the existence of obligations between
individuals under the Convention. 42 This is certainly right. International
law routinely recognizes the existence of rights and obligations without offering a judicial forum in which to enforce them. However, his argument is
still not convincing because there are no cases in which the European Court
of Human Rights has recognized horizontal obligations between non-state
actors contrary to the wording of ECHR Article 1, which only addresses
"the High Contracting Parties. '4 3 Clapham refers to a number of cases in
which the Court has held that states have to adopt measures designed to
protect non-state actors from one another.44 However, there is a difference
between the contention that the ECHR creates direct legal duties between
non-state actors and the Court's position that states must at times step in
and regulate relations between non-state actors. Whereas Clapham takes
the view that the ECHR is horizontally applicable between non-state actors,
the European Court of Human Rights only recognizes that states have diagonal obligations under the ECHR. 45
The Court's interpretation is not undermined by ECHR Article 17,
which states that "[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms
set forth herein .

. . ."46

It has been argued that ECHR Article 17 rests on

the premise that private persons can breach human rights norms and thereby
forfeit their own right. Moreover, some individual rights may be limited
with regard to the rights of others.4 7 From these provisions, it is inferred
that private persons must owe such rights to other private persons.48 However, these limitations on human rights do not exist because non-state actors
owe each other obligations under the Convention. Rather, the limitations
gations of Non-State Actors: Time for a Radical Rethink at the Human Rights Law

Session of the 25th Academy of European Law at the European University Institute
in Florence (June 21-July 2, 2004).
42 Id. at 91-92.
43

ECHR, supra note 38, at art. 1.

CLAPHAM, supra note 19, at 89 nn.3-4.
45 For references to the relevant case law, see infra notes 219, 229-31 and accom-

44

panying text.
ECHR, supra note 38, at art. 17.
See, e.g., id. at arts. 8-11.
48 CLAPHAM, supra note 19, at 184-88. Cf Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 811-13
46

47

(2002).
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represent recognition of the fact that the state may find itself in a position of
conflicting obligations, where it cannot protect one person's right without
limiting the rights of another. In the case of ECHR Article 17, the private
person provokes this conflict of obligations and is therefore denied recognition of his right. In the other cases, the state is permitted to balance between protecting the right of one person, while maintaining respect for the
rights of others, by giving one right precedence over another. 49
Finally, one might also point to ECHR Article 13 in order to support the contention that the ECHR applies horizontally between non-state
actors. The provision states: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstandingthat the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity."50 The passage can be interpreted as

logically implying that not only persons acting in an official capacity, but
also non-state actors can violate human rights. However, it might also be
no more than a clarification that acts in an official capacity are subject to
administrative and subsequent judicial review, which has not traditionally
been the case in some common law jurisdictions. 51
2.

Emerging Horizontal Obligations under Customary Human Rights

Law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) has at least partially attained the status of customary international
law.5 2 If the Universal Declaration considers non-state actors to be human
rights duty holders, then binding customary obligations arising from it
could be regarded as binding on non-state actors as well. Two passages are
often cited as proof that the Universal Declaration also creates human rights
obligations for non-state actors. 53 The Universal Declaration's opening par49 See also WIESBROCK, supra note

38, at 38-40.

ECHR, supra note 38, at art. 13 (emphasis added). Cf.ACHR, supra note 38,
at art. 25; ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 2.3.
51 WmSBROCK, supra note 38, at 41-42.
52 See Hurst Hannum, The Status and Future of the Customary InternationalLaw
of Human Rights: The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
National and InternationalLaw, 25 GA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287 (1995-96).
53 See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 27, at 5862. See also CLAPHAM, supra note 19, at 96 (noting also that the Declaration has to
50

be interpreted in light of the Genocide Convention, which was adopted one day

before the Declaration and explicitly prohibits individuals from partaking in genocide). Cf.Paust, supra note 48, at 811-15 (with references to regional human rights
instruments as well).
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agraph states that "every individual and every organ of society . . . shall

strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and
freedom and . . . to secure their universal and effective recognition and

observance.. . ."54 Article 29(1) of the Universal Declaration gives everyone "duties to the community in which alone the free and full development
of his personality is possible. '55
Neither of the two passages contain a compelling argument for the
existence of horizontal human rights obligations. Article 29 makes reference to individual duties, but is silent on what exactly these duties are. 56 It
is also worth noting that the duties are owed "to the community," and not to
specific rights holders. 57 A study of the travaux priparatoiresreveals that
different drafters were thinking of different duties relating to diverse purposes, such as "loyalty to the State and to the United Nations," "share of
common sacrifices," "obedience to law," "exercise of a useful activity,"
"willing acceptance of obligations and sacrifices demanded for the common
good," and finally "respect [for] the rights of their fellow men. '58 Given the
lack of subsequent clarifying state practice, this ambiguous provision therefore does not offer sufficient proof that the Universal Declaration, and the
customary law emanating from it, create horizontal human rights
obligations.
The opening paragraph does not necessarily have to be understood
to extend the obligations under the Universal Declaration to non-state actors
either. It is equally conceivable that it tasks "'every individual and every
organ of society"' to strive to ensure that states continue to adhere to their
international human rights obligations. 59 After all, the Universal Declaration states quite clearly that "Member States have pledged themselves to
achieve... the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms .... 60
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at pmbl. para. 10,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR]).
55 Id. at art. 29(1).
54

56

Nigel S. Rodley, Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?, in

HumAN RIGHTS IN THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY:

A GLOBAL

CHALLENGE

297, 306

(K. E. Mahoney & P. Mahoney eds., 1993).
57 UDHR, supra note 54, at art. 29(1).
58

See

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON

RIOUSLY:

(1999),
59
60

HuMAN

RIGHTS POLICY, TAKING DUTIES SE-

INDIVIDUAL DUTIES IN INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

available at http://www.ichrp.org/ac/excerpts/9.pdf.

Rodley, supra note 56, at 305 (quoting UDHR, supra note 54).
UDHR, supra note 54, at pmbl. para. 6 (emphasis added).
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a)

THE EMERGING DUTY NOT TO BECOME COMPLICIT IN HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS

The opening paragraph of the Universal Declaration can be drawn
upon to support the view that non-state actors have derivative horizontal
human rights obligations. Every individual and every organ of society has
an obligation to promote the adherence of states to their human rights obligations. At a minimum, this entails that individuals and organs do nothing
to detract from a state's human rights adherence. Therefore, non-state actors can be said to have a duty not to cooperate with states in a way that
furthers the latter's human rights violations. 61 For instance, a company may
have a duty not to collaborate in an oil exploration project with a state, if
their joint venture would motivate that state's security forces to commit
grave human rights abuses.
Some international practices lend support to the proposition that the
duty not to become complicit in human rights abuses has become customary
international law. In three separate resolutions passed between 1982 and
1984, the UN Economic and Social Council requested companies to divest
from South Africa in order not to support the Apartheid regime. 62 Following a Commission of Inquiry's report that Myanmar extensively used slave
labor, the International Labour Organization (ILO) passed a resolution in
2000, which invoked Article 33 of the ILO Constitution for the first time in
the organization's 80-year history. 63 Article 33 authorizes the ILO Governing Body to "recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem
wise and expedient to secure compliance" with recommendations of an ILO
Commission of Inquiry. 64 In the Myanmar case, the Governing Body, earning approval from the International Labor Conference, recommended that
"governments, employers and workers.., review.., the relations that they
may have with [Myanmar] and take appropriate measures to ensure that
[Myanmar] cannot take advantage of such relations to perpetuate or extend
Cf.JAGERS, supra note 25, at 92-95; J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: InternationalMechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples' Rights in Africa, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 851,
904 (2003); Michael K. Addo, Human Rights and TransnationalCorporations An Introduction, in HERMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 3, 29-31 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999); Kinley &
Tadaki, supra note 6, at 963-64.
62
AGERS, supra note 25, at 93 n.66 (citing Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC]
Res. 1982/69 (Oct. 27, 1982); ECOSOC Res. 193/74 (July 29, 1983); ECOSOC
Res. 1984/53 (July 25, 1984)).
61

63

I.L.O. CONST. art.

64 Id.
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the system of forced or compulsory labor referred to by the Commission of
Inquiry. ....-65
In 1999, the UN General Assembly passed a Declaration on the
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to
Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 66 Unfortunately, the General Assembly missed the opportunity to specifically include a duty for non-state actors not to become
complicit in human rights abuses. The Declaration only stipulates, rather
lamely, that, "[e]veryone who, as a result of his or her profession, can affect
the human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of others
should respect those rights and freedoms ....-67 and
[i]ndividuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations also have an important role and a responsibility
in contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion of the right
of everyone to a social and international order in which the
rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can
68
be fully realized.
However, in the same year the UN started a major initiative aimed specifically at inducing corporations not to become complicit in human rights violations. In an address to the 1999 World Economic Forum, UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan challenged business leaders to join an international
initiative, called the Global Compact, that would bring companies together
with UN agencies, labor and civil society to support nine principles in the
areas of human rights, labor and the environment. Hundreds of corporaMeasures, Including Action under Article 33 of the Constitutionof the International Labour Organization, to Secure Compliance by the Government of Myanmar
with the Recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry Established to Examine
the Observance of the Forced Labour Convention, INT'L LABOUR OFFICE GovERNING BODY, 277th Sess., Geneva (Addendum 1) (2000), availableat http://www.
ilo.org/public/english/standards/reln/gb/docs/gb277/pdf/gb-6-addl.pdf (emphases
added); Resolution Concerning the Measures Recommended by the Governing
Body under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution on the Subject of Myanmar, INT'L
LABOUR CONFERENCE, 88th Sess., Geneva P 1(b) (2000), available at http://www.
ilo.org/public/english/standards/reln/ilc/ilc88/resolutions.htm#I.
66 Declarationon the Right and Responsibilityof Individuals, Groups and Organs
of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 53/144, Annex, at art. 11, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess.,
U.N. Doc A/RES/53/144 (Mar. 8, 1999).
67 Id. Annex, at art. 11.
68 Id. at art. 18.3.
65
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tions have since accepted the nine principles. The second principle explicitly requires companies not to become complicit in human rights abuses by
states.

69

These corporate undertakings raise the interesting question of
whether acceptance of obligations by non-state actors (e.g. those contained
in the numerous existing codes of corporate conduct), can be taken into
account in determining whether an obligation under customary international
law exists. Underlying this is an even more fundamental issue. If non-state
actors can create international obligations for themselves through their own
conduct, they can lift themselves up by their own bootstraps to the status of
subjects of international law. States will no longer be the gatekeepers that
govern access to the international legal order. Nevertheless, conduct of
non-state actors is one factor - though not the only one - that can be taken
into account when ascertaining the existence of a rule of customary law.
According to Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute,
customary law results from "general practice accepted as law. '70 The provision does not explicitly refer to state practice. In the Tadic Interlocutory
Appeal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) considered the conduct of insurgents "instrumental in bringing
about the formation of the customary rules at issue. '71 This precedent underscores the principle that self-imposed corporate commitments like the
69

See THE

GLOBAL COMPACT, THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT, at

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/content/AboutTheGC/TheNinePrinciples/lOpr.
pdf. This does not mark the first time that a group of corporations has made a
formal undertaking not to cooperate with human rights abusers. In 1977, Leon
Sullivan, a director of the General Motors Corporation, drew up a Statement of
Principles for US Corporation Operating in South Africa. These Sullivan Principles stipulated, inter alia, that all workers should receive equal pay, there should be
no segregation of workers' facilities, corporations are required to secure black

workers' rights to freedom of association, and assure protection against victimization while pursuing and after attaining these rights. Cf. ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES
AND ETHICAL VALUES IN GLOBAL BUSINESS:

AND INTERNATIONAL CODES TODAY

THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

(S. Prakash Sethi & Oliver F. Williams eds.,

2000); Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codesfor TransnationalCorpora-

tions: What Can the Sullivan and MacBride Principles Tell Us?, 19
LEGAL STUDmS

OXFORD

J.

167 (1999).

70

Statute of the ICJ art. 38(l)(b).

71

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for

Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 108 (Oct. 2, 1995). The ICTY considered
the practice of the FMLN rebel movement in El Salvador and also agreements
concluded by armed opposition groups as evidence of customary law. Id. 107.
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Principles of the Global Compact can be taken into account if they are undertaken with a sense of binding obligation.
Finally, one can look at the United States jurisprudence under the
Alien Tort Claims Act. The term "Alien Tort Claims Act" refers to a provision in the United States Judiciary Act of 1789, which establishes the district courts' original jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations. '72 This provision has
been interpreted by United States courts as providing a cause of action
under United States tort law, if a norm of international law has been
breached. In 2002, the 9th U.S. Circuit held that non-state actors can be
accountable for human rights violations, where they have acted in concert
with state officials or with significant state aid. 73
b)

EMERGING HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF ARMED GROUPS

GOVERNING TERRITORY

It has been noted above that states distinguish themselves from
non-state actors by their power to create and enforce law. 74 However, this
distinction cannot be made with regard to one specific type of non-state
actor: armed groups that have established durable control over a territory
and the population living therein. A contemporary example is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. These "non-state groups look and
behave like would-be states ....

In many cases, the only difference be-

tween states and non-state groups is international recognition. '75 Their
power flows not only from the barrels of their guns but also from the administrations that they have established to govern the population under their
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).
73 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 962-64 (9th Cir. 2002). UNOCAL has
since announced that it intends to settle the case. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has curtailed the scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act to breaches of
international law norms that are as definite and generally accepted as the 18th72

century paradigms motivating the enactment of the statute (e.g. piracy). See Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). It is therefore doubtful what authority
judgments of lower courts, which were handed down prior to that decision, still
have.
74 See Raday, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
75 PABLO POLICZER, ARMED GROUPS PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED
GROUPS:

TOWARD A NEW POLICY ARCHITECTURE 3-4 (2002), at http://www.

armedgroups.org/images/stories/pdfs/0207policzer-humanrights.pdf. For a discussion of the specific human rights advocacy dilemmas posed by these groups, cf.
Ravi Nair, Confronting the Violence Committed by Armed Opposition Groups, 1
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (1998).
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control. Within their realm of territorial control, they can issue binding
orders that can, for all practical purposes, be equated to law. They can (and
do) generate revenue by levying taxes and other fees. In other words, there
is every reason to make customary human rights law fully applicable to
these state-like groups, which would otherwise only be bound by the limited prescriptions of the law of internal armed conflict.76
Moreover, some international practices suggest that this position
may have even attained the status of positive international law. When discussing atrocities committed in the Bosnian war, one member of the Human
Rights Committee took the position that the Bosnian Serb authority that had
control of a territory was bound by human rights law. 77 This finding is
supported by general Human Rights Committee jurisprudence. According
to the Committee, human rights treaties are so-called "localized treaties."
Their protection evolves with the territory of the state party and continues
to protect the people living therein, "notwithstanding change in Government of the State party, including dismemberment in more than one State or
State succession. '78 That is to say, human rights obligations bind the territory. As an insurrectionary movement takes control over territory and establishes an administration, it therefore automatically assumes the human
rights obligations resting on the territory. A similar assumption underlies a
1989 report of the Special Rapporteur in Afghanistan that submitted: "The
territorial sovereignty of the Afghan Government is not fully effective since
some provinces of Afghanistan are totally or partly in the hands of traditional forces. The responsibility for the respect of human rights is therefore
See Rodley, supra note 56, at 298-300; ZEGVELD, supra note 27, at 148-51. See
also Report of the Second Consultative Meeting on the Basic Principlesand Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparationsfor Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Geneva, 20, 21 and 23 October
76

2003), U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 60th Sess., Agenda Item 11, Annex, at 27-28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/57 (Nov. 10, 2003), available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.2004.57.En?Opendocu
ment.
77 Decision on State Succession to the Obligations of the Former Yugoslavia

under the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights (separate opinion

Mullerson), Human Rights Comm., reprinted in 15 European Human Rights Reports 233, 236 (1992) ("Thus [the Bosnian Serbs] might be asked to explain how
they complied with the Covenant, not as a successor State, but as an authority in
control of a territory.").
General Comment No. 26: General Comment on Issues Relating to the Continuity of Obligations to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights,
U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm., 61st Sess., addendum [ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/21/Rev.l/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997).
78
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divided. '79 This seemed to have been confirmed by a 1998 Security Council Resolution calling on "the Afghan factions to put an end to the discrimination against girls and women and to other violations of human rights...
and to adhere to the internationally accepted norms and standards in this
sphere. '80 During the Somali Civil War "all parties in Somalia" were urged
by the Human Rights Commission "to respect human rights and international humanitarian law pertaining to internal armed conflict." ' In a 2004
report, the UN Secretary-General drew attention to "human rights violations" by the Forces nationales de liberation (FNL) in Burundi, even

though this rebel group did not form part of the transitional government of
82
Burundi when the report was published.
3. Quasi-Human Rights Obligations Emerging from International
Criminal Law
Beyond human rights law proper, a regime of non-state obligations
similar to human rights norms is emerging on the basis of international
criminal law. It has been stated that "[t]he Nuremberg Charter applied a
customary international law of human rights in charging the Nazi war
criminals, inter alia, with 'crimes against humanity' ... .-83 Whereas Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter still required state involvement in a
crime against humanity,8 4 this is no longer a prerequisite for a crime against
humanity, so long as the crime is systematically organized. 85 Specific
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan Preparedby the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in Accordance with Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 1988/67, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 45th Sess.,
79

Agenda Item 12, 68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/24 (Feb. 16, 1989).
14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1193 (Aug. 28, 1998).
80 S.C. Res. 1193,
Assistance to Somalia in the Field of Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on
3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/L.71
Human Rights, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 18,
81

(April 9, 1997).
The Secretary-General, Second Report of the Secretary-Generalon the United
Nations Operation in Burundi, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2004/902
82

(Nov. 15, 2004).
83

Louis

HENKIN, RiCHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER &

HANS

SMIT,

INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 986 (2d ed. 1987).
84 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War

Criminalsof
art.
Tribunal
Military
the European Axis Powers and Charterof the International
http://www.yale.
at
available
6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279,
edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm.

See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Int'l
Law Comm'n, 48th Sess., art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (July 8, 1996), availa85
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crimes against the human person, such as slavery, have never required state
involvement. Therefore, non-state actors can commit these crimes. Yet,
international criminal law still must not be equated with a human rights law
that also applies to non-state conduct. First of all, its substantive scope is
much narrower than human rights law in doing so. No dictator would have
to fear prosecution under international law for shutting down every independent media outlet in his country, even though his state clearly violates
human rights law in doing so.
Secondly, the legal consequences differ. Responsibility for a
human rights violation entitles the victim to restitution, compensation or
satisfaction. Both the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter86
American Court of Human Rights can award reparations. Even though
neither the ICCPR nor its Optional Protocol explicitly stipulate it, the UN
Human Rights Committee has also recognized an obligation to make reparations.8 7 Conversely, violations of international criminal law have so far
only resulted in accountability in the form of criminal punishment.
However, the legal consequences of an international crime more
and more resemble the consequences of a breach of human rights law by a
state. According to Article 75(2) of the Rome Statute, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) may order a convicted person to give "reparations to,
or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. ' '8 8 Thus, one could imagine a situation where the Human Rights Committee charges a state involved in systematic slave raids to pay
compensation to the victims, while the ICC orders the individual leaders of
the slave raiding parties to do likewise. Article 75 of the Rome Statute
reveals that a norm of international criminal law contains a primary and
ble at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm; The Secretary-General, Fun-

damental Standards of Humanity: Report of the Secretary-General Submitted
Pursuant to Commission Resolution 2000/69, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess., Agenda
Item 17, 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/91 (Jan. 12, 2001); Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) reprinted in
37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Cf.RATNER & ABRAMS, supra
note 27, at 66-69.
86 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
American
Freedoms art. 41, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; Organization of
O.A.S.T.S.
1969,
22,
Nov.
63,
art.
States, American Convention on Human Rights
for Victims of
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. Cf.Christian Tomuschat, Reparation
(2002).
161-173
157,
L.
CoMp.
&
Grave Human Rights Violations, 10 TUL. J. INT'L
GAOR,
U.N.
8/1977,
No.
87 Garcia Lanza de Netto v. Uru., Communication
(Apr. 3,
Human Rights Comm., 9th Sess., 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/9/D/8/1977
1980).
Rome Statute, supra note 85, at art. 75(2).
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secondary obligation. The primary obligation is the obligation not to engage in certain criminal conduct. The secondary obligation has traditionally
been the duty to endure the criminal penalty. Now an additional secondary
obligation is emerging under international customary law - the individual
perpetrator's duty to give reparations.
While the problem of differing legal consequences is therefore
gradually fading away, international criminal law has a third limitation. Although, it has yet to be firmly established that it applies not only to individuals but also to other non-state actors.8 9 It has been asserted that
multinational corporations have the same rights and duties under customary
international law as natural persons, because they are legal persons. 90 This
assertion is logical, but so far only supported by limited international practice. The Nuremberg Charter provided that organizations could be declared
criminal. 91 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg eventually
declared the leadership corps of the Nazi party, SS, SD, and Gestapo to be
criminal organizations because they participated in war crimes and crimes
against humanity. 92 However, these declarations only had an auxiliary
function. Their purpose was to facilitate the conviction of individuals for
their membership in criminal organizations. The International Convention
Against the Crime of Apartheid pronounces that parties to the convention
must "declare criminal those organizations, institutions and individuals
committing the crime of apartheid." 93 The 1998 Rome Conference considered a proposal to give the ICC jurisdiction over legal persons as well. 94
89 See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 16 (finding that it remains
unclear whether international criminal law creates obligations for groups and
organizations).
90 See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon: An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and their Impact on the Liability of
MultinationalCorporations,20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 96 (2002). See also Laurence Dubin, The Direct Application of Human Rights Standards to, and by, Transnational Corporations, 61 INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS REV. 35, 39 (1999).
91 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (The Nuremberg Charter) art. 9,
Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
92 See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences,
supra note 26, at 262, 266-67.
93 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, at art. 1.2, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N.
Doc. /9030 (Nov. 30, 1973) (emphasis added).
94 See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, Report of the
PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
art. 23.5-23.6, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998)
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This has been cited as proof that the conference delegates accepted that
international criminal law applies to legal persons. 95 However, the proposal
was eventually withdrawn.
4.

Non-Binding Soft Law

Horizontal human rights obligations for non-state actors are also
contained in a number of international instruments that are not legally binding (so-called "soft law"). There are, for instance, UN General Assembly
declarations, which demand that no group or individual may discriminate
on the ground of race or religious belief.96 Such declarations, even though
they are not binding themselves, have normative value, because they can
provide evidence to establish the existence of a rule of customary international law. 97 Nevertheless, said anti-discrimination declarations do not represent binding customary law since there is no international consensus
accepting their content as binding law (opinio juris). Instead, the international community refrained from including obligations for individuals in the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) or the ICCPR even though the declarations had been
passed several years before both treaties were adopted. 98
(The Court shall also have jurisdiction over legal persons, with
the exception of States, when the crimes committed were committed on behalf of such legal persons or by their agencies or
representatives. The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall
not exclude the criminal responsibility of natural persons who are
perpetrators or accomplices in the same crimes.).
Cf. ZEGVELD, supra note 27, at 56-58.
95 Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal
Law Over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International
CriminalCourt, in

LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNA-

139 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: TransnationalCorporationsand Human Rights, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 65-66 (2002).
96 See, e.g., Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
G.A. Res. 1904 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., 1261st plen. mtg., at art. 2, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/1904 (Nov. 20, 1963); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55,
U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/36/55 (Nov. 25,
1981).
97 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ 226, 70 (July 8).
98 For the same reason the provision in the U.N. General Assembly's Declaration
Against Torture, according to which the Declaration is directed also at "other entities exercising effective power," cannot also not be considered as binding customTIONAL LAW
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For transnational corporations, the ILO's Tripartite Declaration of
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy sets out a
number of non-binding horizontal human rights obligations.99 In addition,
there are the Revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
which demand that multinational enterprises respect the human rights of
those affected by their activities. 100 Both instruments have remained ineffective, due at least in part to their toothless supervision mechanisms. 0 1
In order to create more effective, binding horizontal obligations, the
UN presented the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations
(UNCTC) in 1990. However, the Code was never adopted. Corporations
harshly criticized it, feeling that their human rights obligations under the
Code would have superseded those of governments. 10 2 At the same time,
developing countries' desire for foreign investment in the early 1990s superseded their interest in international regulation. 10 3 The 1999 UN Devel1°4
opment Program Human Development Report sought to revive the issue.
In 2003, the UN Subcommission for the Protection of Human Rights picked
up the ball by approving the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
ary law. The subsequently adopted Convention Against Torture explicitly binds
only states. See Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected
to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A.
Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1975).
99 Int'l Labour Org., Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprisesand Social Policy, Nov. 16, 1977, 17 I.L.M. 422 (1978), available at www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/mne.htm.
100 ORGANIZATION

FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

AND

DEVELOPMENT,

REVISED

OECD

GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES Part II, para. 2 (2000), at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf#search=' Oecd%20guidelines%
20for%20multinational%20enterprises.'

101 JAGERS, supra note 25, at 99-119. See also Craig Scott, Multinational Enterprises and Emergent Jurisprudenceon Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CUrLTUAL RIGHTS 563, 569-74 (Asbjirn Eide et
al. eds., 2001).
102 See Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporationsin the Protectionof InternationalHuman Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL

153, 166-67 (1997).
Id. Cf. Peter T. Muchlinski, Attempts to Extend the Accountability of Transnational Corporations: The Role of UNCTAD, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 95, at 97.
TRADE,

103

104

U.N.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT

91 (1999).

1999, 100-
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Rights. 10 5 It remains to be seen whether these Norms will form the basis for
a fresh attempt to create binding corporate obligations or whether economic
interests will once again prevail. The Human Rights Council has not endorsed the draft Norms though the former Commission on Human Rights
requested the UN Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative on
the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises.
II. RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR CONDUCT OF NON-STATE ACTORS

In the Westphalian international order, states are the primary subjects of international law, holding rights and obligations. Created through
instruments of international law, human rights obligations are based on this
framework. These obligations rest first and foremost on states, which owe
them erga omnes to all other states. 10 6 Therefore, the law of human rights
responsibility is doctrinally a mere sub-set of the law of state responsibility. 10 7 Nevertheless, some international human rights lawyers still tend to
regard their discipline as sui generis. This might be due to the fact that
human rights norms seek to influence the relationship between the individual and the state, and not relations between states. However, this sui
generis hampers the progress of human rights, as Meron has pointed out:
[u]nfortunately, the principles of state responsibility have
often remained terra incognita for human rights lawyers.
This is a situation that must not be allowed to continue. By
coupling human rights with the corpus of law governing
state responsibility, the latter is mobilized to serve the for10 8
mer and to advance its effectiveness.
By viewing international human rights law in the context of general international law, a jurisprudence that has evolved over centuries becomes availa105 Draft Report of the Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, 55th Sess., at 52, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L. 11 (Aug. 13, 2003). Cf
David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2003); Surya Deva, The UN's Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporationsand Other Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the
Right Direction?, 10 ILSA J. IBr'L & COMP. L. 493 (2004).
106 See Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ
LEXIS 2 (Feb. 5).
107 For a discussion, see JAGERS, supra note 25, at 200-04.
108 Theodor Meron, State Responsibilityfor Violations of Human Rights, 83 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 372, 372 (1989).
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ble to a field of international law that is little more than half a century old.
The question of when a state is responsible for acts that one non-state actor
commits against another, has occupied international law since its inception,
albeit not as one of human rights law. Instead, the question has been addressed by the law of responsibility for injuries to foreign nationals - a
branch of law which has been characterized as one of the important predecessors to contemporary human rights law. 10 9
Under what circumstances does conduct of a non-state actors cause
a state to violate its human rights obligations? Two broad principles can be
distinguished:
1. A state is responsible for the conduct of individuals exercising
the state's power and authority, since these acts and omissions
are attributed to that state even if the actors exceed the authority
they were granted.
2. Acts or omissions of real non-state actors are generally not attributable. However, human rights law may hold a state responsible when an injury results because the state failed to fulfill its
diagonal obligation to protect human rights holders with due diligence from harmful non-state conduct." 0
These two principles have been referred to as direct and indirect
responsibility."' The term "indirect responsibility" is unfortunate because
it wrongly suggests that this type of human rights violation is less grave.
The term also implies that there is always a bearer of direct responsibility,
even though it is rare that non-state actors are directly bound by international human rights law. It is equally misleading to distinguish between
responsibility arising from action and responsibility arising from omission.
A state can breach its duties of due diligence by taking action, for example
if state organs actively obstruct investigations into murders committed by
non-state death squads.1 2 Conversely, even an omission by a private actor
may be attributed to the state and give rise to a human rights violation. An
109

See

HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN

42 (1996). Cf. Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The HistoricalDevelopment of the
Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 265 (2004).
110 Hessbruegge, supra note 109, at 268.
I" See, e.g., Craig Scott, TranslatingTorture into TransnationalTort: Conceptual
Divides in the Debate on Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Harms, in
TORTURE AS TORT 45, 47-48 (Craig Scott ed., 2001). For a discussion of the terminology issue, cf. CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 214-16 (1928).
CONTEXT

112 See infra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
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example would be a guard in a privately operated prison, who fails to protect an inmate from assault by other inmates.11 3 To avoid these terminological pitfalls, this paper will refer to the two principles respectively as
responsibility due to attribution and responsibility based on a failure to protect with due diligence.
A.

Attribution of Conduct to the State

Attribution, or "imputability," as some prefer to call it, occurs when
the individual or his conduct is so closely linked to the state in a specific
situation that the conduct can be considered that of the state itself. The
doctrines of attribution have been extensively researched by the International Law Commission of the UN (1LC) and set out in the Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles),
which are accompanied by a detailed commentary. 4 Articles 4 through 11
of the Draft Articles outline when individual acts or omissions are attributable to the state. Drawn up by an international group of "highly qualified
publicists,""' 5 the Draft Articles and, to a lesser extent, the Commentary to
the Draft Articles, codify pre-existing customary international law.
1. Responsibility for de jure Agents
A state is responsible for the conduct of all persons that it has designated to be its agents by way of an act of domestic law. These persons
can be referred to as de jure agents. Acts of the legislative, judicial or
executive organs are attributable to the state. 116 The rank of the official is
irrelevant. " 7 Conduct is attributable to the state regardless of whether the
acting organ is part of the central government or a territorial unit." 8 Even
See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
114 Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 4359, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/NO/557/81l/img/NO155781.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter Draft
Articles].
"15 Statute of the ICJ art. 38(l)(d).
116 Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 44. See also Difference Relating to Immunity
from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,
1999 ICJ 62, at 87 (Apr. 29).
117 Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 44 ("... whatever position it holds in the
organization of the State... ").
118 Id. See also LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 ICJ Order It 28-29 (Req. for the
Indication of Provisional Measures) (Mar. 3, 1999); Ireland v. U.K., App. No.
5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 77-78, (1978) (Court). This raises the interesting
legal question whether the central state can still be held responsible where there
113
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acts by which the organ breaches municipal law or exceeds the authority
vested in it (so-called ultra vires acts), are attributable to the state, so long
as the organ acts within its capacity.11 9 The rule has attained the status of
customary international law because it provides for "clarity and security in
international relations."'1 20 It saves third-party states from the arduous task
of ascertaining which acts were intra vires and which were not.' 21 International law also steers clear of interference with a state's internal structures
by avoiding prescribing how a state must organize itself and control its
agents. 122
The principle also applies to human rights obligations 123 and is of
particular importance in this context because "the most egregious violations
of human rights, such as torture, murder, or causing the disappearance of
individuals, would also breach the internal law of the state or, at least formally, the policy or the instructions issued by senior governmental officials."'1 24 Yet, the clarity and security provided by the decision to attribute
ultra vires acts to the state is limited by the fact that it only applies where
the organ "acts in that capacity."' 25 The Commentary to the Draft Articles
clarifies that "[c]ases where officials acted in their capacity as such, albeit
unlawfully or contrary to instructions, must be distinguished from cases
where the conduct is so removed from the scope of their official functions
that it should be assimilated to that of private individuals, not attributable to
the State."'1 26 Even if a state official abuses the means placed at his disposal
exists a strong devolution of power to territorial units, e.g. whether the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina can be held responsible for all human rights violations incurred by organs of the Republic of Srpska (or whether the territorial unit itself can
be held responsible). An answer to this question would go beyond the scope of this
paper, but the question shows another dimension of the issues raised by the abovementioned power shift in the international system. Cf Gordon A. Christenson, Attributing Acts of Omission to the State, 12 MicH. J. INT'L L. 312, 357-60 (1991).
119 Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 44.
120 Id. at 99. See also supra note 109 and cases referred to therein.
121 Dionisio Anzillotti, La responsabiliti internationale des dtats a raison des
dommages soufferts par des itrangers, 13 REVUE GENfRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

(1906).

Id.
123 Veldsquez Rodrfguez v. Hond., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
170 (July
29, 1988); Ireland v. U.K., App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 77-78, (1978)
122

(Court).
124

Meron, supra note 108, at 375.

125

Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 44.
Id. at 102.

126
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for his official duties, his conduct will not be attributed to the state as long
as he does not make use of his official authority. 127 Therefore, a state violates its human rights obligations if a policeman murders a suspect in the
course of an arrest, regardless of whether that state's domestic law outlaws
the conduct or not. But if the policeman joins an extremist political group
and shoots a political adversary off-duty, this conduct is not attributed to the
state even if he used his police revolver. In the latter case, responsibility
can only ensue if the state displayed a lack of due diligence in failing to
prevent the misuse of state-owned weaponry or sensitive information to
which only the state authorities are privy.
2.

"Adopted" Conduct

The case of "adopted conduct" is actually a sub-category of de jure
agency. The state is responsible because it retrospectively authorizes certain conduct and thereby makes it its own. The Draft Articles stipulate that
conduct is attributed, "if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and
adopts the conduct in question as its own."' 12 The principle, which was
mentioned as early as 1749 by the German writer Christian Wolff,129 was
endorsed by the ICJ in the Tehran Hostages case. 130
On November 4, 1979, several hundred militant young Iranians
seized the United States embassy and took diplomats and members of staff
hostage to protest the fact that the United States had allowed the deposed
Shah into the United States for medical treatment. The ICJ considered Iran
legally responsible for the events, even though the acts had been committed
by militant private individuals, because "[t]he approval given to these facts
by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian State, and the
decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State."' 131 To come to
this finding, the Court took into account public expressions of approval by
Iranian officials, namely a decree by the Ayatollah Khomeini stating that
Iran would not permit the release of the hostages until the United States
Cf Kenneth P. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib.Rep.
92, 110-11 (1987).
128 Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 45.
127

129 CHRISTIAN WOLFF,

2 Jus GENTrIUM

METHODO SCIENTIFICA PETRACTATUM

160

(Joseph H. Drake trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1749). Cf.Hessbruegge,
supra note 109, at 288-89.
130 U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 3435 (May 24).
131Id. at paras. 73-74.
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extradited the Shah to be tried in Iran and also returned his property to
Iran. 132

The adoption principle was also implicitly endorsed when the Security Council censured Israel for the capture of Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann in Argentina and his clandestine transfer to Israel. 133 Israel was held
responsible, even though it never admitted that Eichmann's captors were
government agents. Instead the Israeli Foreign Minister at the time referred
to them as a "volunteer group.' 3 4
In a third case, Greece was held liable for the breach of a concession agreement by Crete, which occurred when the latter was an autonomous territory of the Ottoman Empire. Greece incurred responsibility
because it had made the breach its own by endorsing and continuing it even
after it acquired territorial sovereignty over the island. 135
For adoption of a certain conduct to occur, two requirements must
be fulfilled: acknowledgement of the conduct and adoption thereof. With
regard to the first requirement, the key question is whose knowledge is relevant. Must the highest state authorities have knowledge (as they had in the
precedents just mentioned)? If that is the case, the principle would be virtually unusable in the human rights context because such knowledge can
hardly ever be proven. This view would also be inconsistent with the general principle that all conduct of state organs acting in that capacity is attributable regardless of their rank or authority. Consequentially, it cannot make
a difference which state organ has knowledge.
However, the approving state must know about the specific behavior that would amount to a breach of human rights, if it were undertaken by
the state authorities themselves. Knowledge of the general conduct is not
enough. It must be remembered that only the conduct itself is attributable.
The individual does not become an agent by virtue of the act of adoption.
Excesses on his part, which are unknown to the state, are therefore not
attributable. Because the conduct, and not the agent, is adopted, any analogy to the ultra vires principle, according to which unauthorized conduct of
state officials is still attributed, is inappropriate. For instance, if police authorities approve of the arrest of a suspect by a private citizen but are unaware of the fact that the citizen seriously mistreated the suspect in the
course of the arrest, an adoption of the mistreatment does not take place.
Id. at para. 71.
133 S.C. Res. 138, at 4, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. S/4349
(1960).
134 See Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 102.
135 Concession des phares de l'Empire Ottoman (Gr. v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 155, 198
(Perm. Ct. Arb., 1931). Cf.Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 119.
132
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The European Court of Human Rights had to consider a similar scenario in
the case of Stocke v. F.R.G..136 In this case German authorities agreed that

an informer would set out to locate a fugitive from justice in France. 3 7 The
informer went beyond the agreement and brought Stockd back to Germany
against his will. 38 The Court held that Germany had not violated Stocks's
rights, since the German authorities had not known about the informer's
plan to bring him back to Germany. 13 9
With regard to the requirement of adoption, there are several issues
that are of particular importance in the human rights context. Given that
states will rarely admit that they approve of private atrocities, the question
arises whether adoption must be expressed by public statement or can be
made tacitly. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY found that the statement
of approval has to be given publicly. 140 Conversely, the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal has taken the view that tacit adoption is sufficient. 14 1 The latter
view deserves support. There is no reason to exclude cases of tacit approval
as long as the approval can be proven by circumstantial evidence. If a state
makes use of the conduct in question just as if it were its own, it cannot be
relevant whether it has the political savvy not to say so in public. Especially in the case of human rights violations, a state would hardly publicly
adopt them as its own.
Adoption has to be distinguished, however, from mere endorsement
of a given non-state conduct. The adoption principle must be applied restrictively because it establishes state responsibility even though the state
had no control of the conduct when it occurred. For this reason, mere endorsement of a certain conduct does not suffice for the said conduct to be
attributed. 142 Otherwise, the state would be held responsible for all private
acts that serve its interests and thus receive its tacit endorsement. An example illustrates the point: It has been argued that Yugoslavia was responsible
for acts of ethnic cleansing committed by Bosnian Serb forces, since it ratified these actions. 143 This clearly overextends the principle. Yugoslavia
might have breached its human rights obligations because it had effective
136

Stockd v. F.R.G., 199 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991).

137
138

Id. at 18.
Id.

139

Id.

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 118 (July 15, 1999).
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 92,
111 (1987).
142 Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 121.
143 John Quigley, State Responsibility for Ethnic Cleansing, 32 U.C. DAvIs L.
140

141 Kenneth P. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17

REV.

341, 367 (1999).
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control of Bosnian Serb Forces and the Bosnian Serb Forces were therefore
Yugoslavia's de facto agent. 144 But merely agreeing with non-state conduct
that occurs outside of a state's sphere of control can surely not give rise to
state responsibility.
The line between mere endorsement of private action and adoption
of such action as the state's own, is a fine one. Three instances of adoption
can be distilled from the case law. First, the adoption principle applies
where the state formally legalizes a certain conduct retrospectively or where
it factually treats such conduct for all purposes as if it were legal. Obviously, in the case of de facto legalization, the rank and authority of the
adopting state organ has to be taken into account. Second, the principle
applies if the state takes further action through which it takes advantage of
the individual's conduct. This happened in the Eichmann case, because
Israel made use of the capture by putting Eichmann on trial. It also occurred in the Tehran Hostages case, since the Iranian state used the hostage
situation in an attempt to extort certain concessions from the United States.
Third, adoption with retrospective state responsibility can be assumed when
a state approves of past non-state conduct and continues it after the state
assumes control over it.
3. De Facto Agents and Agent Groups
Attribution is not limited to cases where a state legally assumes
responsibility for its agents or for adopted conduct. The conduct of an individual is also attributable to a state if the individual is a de facto agent
acting on behalf of the state. The Draft Articles stipulate that acts of nonstate persons are attributable if they are "in fact acting on the instructions
of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct."1 45 While either of these two instances suffices on its own to establish
state responsibility, control and instruction usually go together and reinforce each other mutually. Because they are under state control, de facto
agents accept instructions. By way of instructions, the state exercises and
maintains its control. In the Blake case, for instance, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights found that a paramilitary group (a so-called "Civilian Self-Defense Patrol"), which had abducted and killed Mr. Blake, was a
de facto agent of Guatemala. 146 In coming to this conclusion, the Court
noted that the group had "an institutional relationship with the Army, performed activities in support of the armed forces' functions, and, moreover,

145

See infra notes 155-66 and accompanying text.
Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 45.

146

Blake Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 36, q 75-78 (1998).
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received resources, weapons, training and direct orders from the Guatemalan Army and operated under its supervision."' 147
Two questions arise if one seeks to determine who may be regarded
as a de facto agent. Firstly, one has to ask how closely the state must control or instruct the agent. This issue will be referred to as intensity of control. The second issue deals with the object of control: Who does the state
have to instruct or control: the acting individual himself or just the group to
which he belongs?
The ICJ addressed both issues in the Nicaraguacase. Among other
things, the case dealt with the question of whether the United States
breached international humanitarian law by supporting the Contra rebels,
who had committed gross atrocities in the course of its insurgency campaign against the Sandinista government. The Court took the position that a
very high intensity of control and instruction, referred to by the Court as
"effective control," was necessary in order to assume a de facto agency. 48
The Court held that
United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and
equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or
paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its
operation, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the
evidence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of
attributing to the attributing to the United States the acts
committed by the contras in the course of their military or
49
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.
While the United States was therefore not responsible for the conduct of the
Contras, the Court found that the conduct of so-called Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets (UCLAs) during the Nicaraguan civil war was attributable to the United States. 150 These UCLAs were persons of various

Id. at 76.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 54-55
(June 27). See also U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3, 29 (May 24). Cf William L. Pereira Assoc. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 198, 227 (1984); Kenneth P. Yeager v. Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
92, 101 (1987).
149 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 54 (June
27).
150 Id. at 51.
147

148
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55

nationalities, which were paid by, and acting on the direct instructions of,
United States military or intelligence personnel. 15'
With regard to the object of control, the ICJ took the view that the
state must have effective control of the individual agent or specifically command him to undertake the conduct that violates humanitarian law. Effective control of the Contras as a group would not have been sufficient. The
Court held that the United States was only responsible for breaches of humanitarian law by the Contras if it either had "effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations
were committed," 152 or if the "United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by
the applicant State." 15 3 In his separate opinion, Judge Ago clarified that
state organs would have to specifically instruct the Contras to commit a
particular act or to carry out a particular task of some kind on behalf of the
154
United States.

152

Id. at 45.
Id. at 55.

153

Id. at 54. Cf U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980

151

I.C.J. 3, 29 (May 24).
154

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 188-89

(June 27) (separate opinion of Judge Ago). This position corresponds with the
holdings of other international tribunals. The Lehigh Valley Railroad cases concerned various acts of sabotage committed by German private individuals in the
U.S. during World War I. In the initial case, it was proven that German diplomats
had been ordered to instruct individuals to sabotage "all kinds of factories for war
deliveries; [whereas] railroads, dams, bridges must not be touched there." However, it was not proven that the saboteurs had received specific instructions on
which targets to attack. Therefore, the U.S.-German Mixed Claims Commission
held that the conduct of the individuals was not attributable to the state. Lehigh
Valley Railroad I (U.S. v. Ger.), 8 R.I.A.A. 100, 101 (U.S.-Ger. Mixed Cl. Comm.,
1931). Shortly after the decision was handed down, evidence emerged proving that
the individual saboteurs had indeed been instructed to attack specific sites. The
case was reopened and Germany was held responsible for the acts of sabotage.
Lehigh Valley Railroad (Rehearing Grant) (U.S. v. Ger.), 8 R.I.A.A. 104, 114-15
(U.S.-Ger. Mixed Cl. Comm, 1932). Lehigh Valley Railroad II (U.S. v. Ger.), 8
R.I.A.A. 225, 339-45 (U.S.-Ger. Mixed Cl. Comm, 1939). Cf L.H. Woolsey, The
Arbitraton of the Sabotage Claims Against Germany, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 737, 738
(1939). The U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal based its decision on the same legal consideration in the case of Short. The applicant was an American, who was forced by
unidentified individuals to leave Iran. The applicant argued that the Ayatollah
Khomeini's general statements against Americans residing in Iran rendered those
individuals who attacked Americans to be de facto agents of the Iranian state. The
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Since the Nicaragua decision, the standard of the de facto agency
has shifted. The Nicaragua standard is still valid concerning the intensity
of control, but has changed with regard to the object of control. In the
Tadic case, the ICTY concerned itself with the issue of de facto agency. In
order to determine whether the accused had committed war crimes against
civilians in violation of the Geneva Convention IV of 1949, the Tribunal
had to address the question of whether there had been an international conflict in Bosnia after the Yugoslav national army formally withdrew from the
armed conflict in May 1992. This was the case only if the Army of the
Republic of Srpska could be regarded as a de facto agent of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY). Thus, the issue of
responsibility for de facto agents specifically arose as a matter of state responsibility rather than as one of individual criminal responsibility, which
may have different standards.
The ICTY's Trial Chamber upheld the ICJ's test of effective control. 155 It found that the Republic of Srpska and its army received material
and financial support from the FRY and that a number of former soldiers
and commanders of the Yugoslav army had continued to serve in the Srpska
army. 156 For these reasons, the Court held that Yugoslavia "had the capability to exercise great influence and perhaps even control over" the Republic of Srpska and its army. 15 7 However, there was not sufficient evidence to
prove that the FRY had made use of this capability and actually exercised
effective control. 158 Instead, the Republic of Srpska and its army were
1 59
nothing more than "allies, albeit highly dependent allies, of the [FRY]."'
Judge McDonald, the presiding judge in the Tadic Trial Chamber, dissented
and argued that dependency of the presumed agent and the state's capability
to use this dependency to exercise effective control was sufficient for a de
facto agency. 160 The ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected Judge McDonald's
position and confirmed the opinion of the Trial Chamber's majority, finding
commission rejected the argument, because "these pronouncements were of a general nature and did not specify that Americans should be expelled en masse." Alfred L.W. Short v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 76, 85 (1987). But see id. at
93-94 (dissenting opinion of Judge Brower).
155 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment,
585-88,
600 (May 7, 1997).
156 Id. at
588-604.
157 Id. at
605-06.
158

Id.
Id. at

606.
Id. (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute).
159
160
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that the capacity to exercise effective control was not sufficient if the principal did not in fact assume effective control.' 6 '
Therefore, atrocious conduct of a non-state actor is not attributed to
a state according to the principle of de facto agency just because a state
gives assistance and advice to the non-state actor - even if that state knows
about the atrocities. 62 Applying the principle to our introductory example
about the Afghan child soldiers, one has to conclude that the Northern Alliance forces were dependent allies, but not defacto agents of the U.S. in the
Afghanistan campaign. Given that both actors shared the common military
goal of overthrowing the Taliban regime, there was no need for the U.S. to
assume effective control of the group during the fighting phase. Therefore,
the Northern Alliance's use of child soldiers cannot be attributed to the
U.S., because the U.S. did not adopt the conduct as its own either.
While the ICTY Appeals Chamber confirmed the Nicaragua decision with regard to the necessary intensity of control, it expanded the scope
of de facto agency by changing the object of control. In the Nicaragua
case, the ICJ held that actions of the Contras were only attributable to the
United States if the individual members of the Contra group were assigned
specific instructions by the United States. Conversely, the ICTY Appeals
chamber held that specific instructions were not necessary. If a state has
"overall control" over an organized and hierarchically structured group
(such as a military unit), all acts of its members are attributable to the state
even if there is no specific control of the individual or if the individual acts
contrary to specific instructions. 63 The Chamber pointed out that "a structure, a chain of command and a set of rules as well as the outward symbols
of authority" characterize such groups. 164 For this reason, "[n]ormally a
member of the group does not act on his own but conforms to the standards
prevailing in the group and is subject to the authority of the head of the
group."'1 65 This allows a state to affect individual actions by only controlling the agent group. Even where the individual disobeys group orders, it is
still justified to hold the state responsible given that the state is responsible
for ultra vires acts of its officials. By the same token, the state must be held

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, in 80-162 (July 15, 1999).
162 Cf.Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, The Doctrine of State Responsibility as a Potential Means of Holding Private Actors Accountable for Human Rights, 5 MELBOURNE J. IN'rL L. 1, 7 (2004).
161

163 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment,
164

Id.

165

Id.

120 (July 15, 1999).
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responsible for disobedient members of a group if it has chosen to exercise
effective control over that group. 166
The decision of the ICTY to depart from the ICJ's jurisprudence
has been criticized. Yet, the international acceptance of the U.S. military
action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan lends support to the Tadic
jurisprudence. The Taliban had control over Al-Quaeda as a group. 167 The
Taliban regime could therefore be held responsible for knowingly allowing
Afghan territory to be used to injure other states. 168 However, an AlQuaeda cell, whose members were operating outside of Afghan territory,
carried out the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Taliban were therefore
unable to stop the individuals that eventually carried out the attacks. That
they were nevertheless held responsible, affirms the holding in the Tadic
case: Overall control over an organized and hierarchically structured group
suffices to attribute conduct of individual group members to a state even
where that state does not have control over these specific individuals.
In the human rights context, this view seems to have long been
adopted. In the Blake Case, the Inter-American Court only required a
showing that the Guatemalan state effectively controlled the organized and
hierarchically structured Civilian Self-Defense Patrols, to whom Blake's
murderer pertained. The Court did not require proof that the Guatemalan
state had given the specific instruction to murder Mr. Blake or had effectively controlled the individual murderer. Instead, it held that "those patrols should be deemed to be agents of the State and that the actions they
perpetrated should therefore be imputable to the State."' 69
To summarize, a de facto agency exists where a state exercises its
effective control over an individual or where the individual receives speId. 121.
167 See S. C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4415th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/
1378 (2001). See also Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/
166

168
169

(Islamic extremists from around the world.., continued to use
Afghanistan as a training ground and base of operations for their
worldwide terrorist activities in 2000. The Taliban, which controlled most Afghan territory, permitted the operation of training
and indoctrination facilities for non-Afghans and provided logistics support to members of various terrorist organizations ... the
United States repeatedly made clear to the Taliban that it would
be held responsible for any terrorist attacks undertaken by Bin
Ladin while he is in its territory.).
Cf Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
Blake Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 36, 78 (1998) (emphasis added).
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cific instructions from that state. A state's mere capability to control or
direct is not sufficient. If the individual is a member of an organized and
hierarchically structured group, it suffices that the agent group is effectively
controlled by a state in order to attribute human rights violations of individual group members to that state.
4.

Para-Statal Entities and State-Owned Companies

In recent times, many countries have begun to outsource services
traditionally provided by public authorities, for example the provision of
electricity or water. New public corporations, semi-public entities or private companies are created, or an existing private firm is contracted to provide such services. Sometimes these parastatal entities are assigned even
the most traditional of state functions. In a number of countries, for instance, private contractor firms operate prisons on behalf of the state.
The Draft Articles stipulate that the conduct of a non-state entity
"empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international
law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular
instance."' 170 Parastatal entities are therefore de jure agents of the state, to
the extent that they are empowered to assume public functions. A state
violates its human rights obligations, for instance, if employees of a pri171
vately operated prison physically abuse the inmates.
The decisive factor required for attribution to occur is the entity's
performance of a public function. How the entity was created is irrelevant.
The nature of the entity can neither prevent nor trigger state responsibility.
The European Commission on Human Rights has held that the fact that an
industrial board is created by statute does not make its actions attributable
to the state. 172 Conversely, the UN Human Rights Committee found in
B.d.B. v. The Netherlands that "a State Party is not relieved of its obligations under the Covenant when some of its functions are delegated to other
autonomous organs." 17 3 The specific "autonomous organ" in question was
Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 44.
See Chirwa, supra note 162, at 6.
172 X v. Ir., App. No. 4125/69, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 42 (1971). See
also Schering Corp. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 361, 370 (1984) (holding
that the fact that certain workers' government councils were created by government
decree does not make them agents of the Iranian state as long as they do not fulfil
state functions and are not subject to government interference).
173 B. d. B. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 273/1988, U.N. GAOR,
Human Rights Comm., 35th Sess., 6.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/35/D/ 273/1988 (Feb.
5, 1989). Cf. Barthold v. Germany, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 46 (1985) (holding
170
171
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an industrial board made up of representatives of employer and employee
organizations, which had no formal connection to the Dutch Government.
If a state has allowed religious bodies - for example, a religious
police force - to make rules and enforce them with quasi-public power, the
religious body's conduct is also attributable. In X v. Germany, the European Commission on Human Rights found a complaint to be admissible
which concerned a church regulation that stated that property rights in
tombs lapsed after a certain period of time because the church had assumed
public functions in maintaining the graveyard. 174
When does a private institution exercise elements of public authority? The jurisprudence of international bodies provides some guidance.
The European Court of Human Rights took the material ambit of Convention rights into account. The case of Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom

concerned corporal punishment in a private school. 175 The Court noted that
Protocol 1 of the ECHR protects the right to education, which entails the
student's right to study in an environment of school discipline.1 76 The
Court found that a state could not "absolve itself from responsibility [to
secure a Convention right (i.e. to ensure school discipline)] by delegating its
obligations to private bodies or individuals."'177 Therefore, the state could
be held responsible for a breach of the freedom from inhumane or degrading treatment and punishment, although private persons in a private institution had ordered and carried out the corporal punishment. The same
reasoning underlies the decision in Van der Mussele v. Belgium.178 In this

case, the European Court of Human Rights found that the defendant state
could be held responsible for the conduct of a private professional body, the
Ordre des avocats, because it had relied on that private body to fulfill its
179
obligation to provide legal aid pursuant to Article 6(3)(c) of the ECHR.
To establish whether a private entity carries out a public function,
one can also look at its sources of financing. In my view, there is a rebuttable presumption that a private business, which runs at a loss on a sustained
basis and has to be kept afloat by state subsidies, is fulfilling a public functhe state responsible for the actions of a professional Veterinary Surgeon's Council
because the Council had been awarded independent rule-making power by the
legislator).
174 X v. F.R.G., App. No. 8363/78, 20 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 163, 166
(1980).
175 Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 247-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
177

Id. at 1 27.
Id.

178

Van der Mussele v. Belgium, 70 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1983).

179

Id.

176

[

28-29.
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tion - otherwise one would presume that the state is squandering its resources without fulfilling a public purpose.
It has been noted that parastatal entities are de jure agents, to the
extent that they have been assigned public functions. Therefore, the principle that ultra vires acts are attributable applies mutatis mutandis. The state
cannot deny responsibility for human rights violations by claiming that the
parastatal entity acted contrary to domestic law or otherwise exceeded its
authority as long as the entity acted within its general area of authorized
conduct. 8 0 Abuses in a privately operated prison are therefore attributable
to the state even if the contract between the state and the prison operator
stipulated that such abuses must not occur.
Apart from parastatal entities exercising public functions, there are
state-owned or state-controlled companies of a purely commercial nature
(e.g. a state-owned airline). One might be inclined to treat these companies
as if they were state organs. For state organs, the state can incur responsibility no matter whether the organs exercise their public function (acta iure
imperii) or act commercially (acta iure gestionis).'81 For instance, a state
would breach its human rights obligations if one of its administrative agencies awarded a procurement contract on a racially discriminatory basis. The
question arises whether that also holds true with regard to conduct of a
private company, which just happens to be owned by the state. May the
editor of a state owned newspaper assert a stronger right to freedom of
expression against the publisher than a colleague working for a privately
owned paper? May government officials not instruct the editor to refrain
from publishing a certain opinion piece, even if their action is purely commercially motivated (e.g. because they do not want to endanger sales by
offending the newspaper's particularly conservative readership)? Should
the state be subject to more restrictive rules of investment management than
a private shareholder even though it is just acting how any reasonable businessperson would? In favor of that position, one could argue that the state
is only in the position to give instructions to the company because it has
used public funds to form or purchase it. In addition, the state seems to
exercise effective control much as it does over de facto agents because its
instructions are followed.
Cf. in the context of armed non-state entities, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT94-1-A, Judgment, 119 (July 15, 1999) ("In this case, by analogy with the rules
concerning State responsibility for acts of State officials acting ultra vires, it can be
held that the State incurs responsibility on account of its specific request to the
private individual or individuals to discharge a task on its behalf.").
181 Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 87.
180
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However, this view leads to arbitrary results. If the state had declined to exercise control over said newspaper and instead appointed an
independent board of directors that had taken the same commercially motivated decision, the conduct would not be attributable. International law accepts the separation between different corporate entities, unless the
"corporate veil" is used as a vehicle for fraud or evasion. 182 By the same
token, the conduct of a state-owned company that does not fulfill a public
purpose must only be attributed to the state if the Government interferes
with the company out of political motivations inconsistent with the commercial interest of the company. 83 Thus, a state owning a cosmetics company violates its human rights obligations if it instructs the management to
award suppliers' contracts only to members of a certain race. However, it
would not breach its human rights obligations if it instructed the management to concentrate solely on cosmetic products for a certain racial group
only because that market segment seemed lucrative.
This view is also in harmony with the principles of de facto agency
outlined above.184 A state that owns a company or the majority of its shares
has the capability to exercise effective control over it. However, the mere
capability to exercise effective control does not give rise to de facto agency.
Effective control has to actually be exercised. If the Government gives an
instruction to the management that is motivated by political reasons, it is
exercising effective control. However, if the Government acts no different
than any reasonable private businessperson would, the state conduct can be
regarded as neutral and not controlling, which is why an agency may not be
assumed.
5. Groups Usurping State Functions
According to the Draft Articles, private conduct is also attributed to
the state "if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of
the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements
of authority."'18 5 The Commentary to the Draft Articles clarifies that "cir182

See Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ

LEXIS 2 (Feb. 5).
183 See Kevin A. Bove, Attribution Issues in State Responsibility, 84 AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. PROC. 51, 63-64 (1990) (quoting Remarks by Jane Chalmers). Chalmers
also makes the sensible suggestion to place the onus on the government to prove
that a decision is not politically motivated. Cf. Draft Articles, supra note 114, at
107-08.
184

See supra notes 145-69 and accompanying text.

185

Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 45.
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cumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority"
occur in times of "revolution, armed conflict or foreign occupation, where
the regular authorities dissolve, are disintegrating, have been suppressed or
are for the time being inoperative."' 186 This attribution doctrine was applied
by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to the conduct of Revolutionary
Guards or "Komitehs," which fulfilled police functions during the Iranian
187
Revolution in the absence of regular state authorities.
Two rationales underlie this form of agency. In some cases one
might see it as a special case of due diligence. The state is held responsible
for allowing private individuals to usurp its powers. 188 In other cases it
might be a mere principle of necessity, deriving from the restrictions implicit in the Westphalian paradigm of state responsibility. Since international law cannot hold the usurping non-state actors accountable, the
chaotic state, in which they operate, is held responsible. In practice, this
established principle of positive international law proves very helpful to
human rights lawyers that often find it hard to prove that a certain private
group was effectively controlled by a state. The principle is also important
in cases concerning a person's right not to be refouled to another state,
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger
of being subjected to torture (see Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture [CAT]). In Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, a case before the Committee
Against Torture, the author pleaded not to be returned to Somalia, since he
feared that one of the clans ruling parts of Somalia would subject him to
atrocities. Australia responded that there was no involvement of state officials, as required by Article 1(1) of the CAT. The Committee found that
the clan had set up quasi-governmental structures and exercised prerogatives that are normally exercised by the legitimate government. Accordingly, the clam members were to be regarded as "acting in an official

Id. at 109.
187 See Kenneth P. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.Rep.
92, 201 (1987).
188 But see Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 109-10 (justifying this attribution
principle as an "agency of necessity"). "Just as citizens have the right to collective
self-defence in the absence of regular forces (levie en masse), they may assume
governmental functions where government is absent." Hessbruegge, supra note
109, at 274. It seems strange that a right of citizens against the state could justify
obligations of that state towards other states. It also seems odd to hold a state that
has just re-established itself responsible for human rights violations that occurred
while chaos persisted.
186
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capacity" (see Article 1 of the CAT) and Elmi's claim that he had to fear
torture was upheld. 8 9
6.

Successful Insurrectional Movements

Like the principles on other groups usurping state power, the legal
principles dealing with successful revolutionary movements are also a consequence of the fact that the movements themselves could not bear responsibility according to traditional international law (unless they had been
recognized as belligerents). In principle, acts of revolutionary movements,
mobs, etc. are not directly attributable to the state.190 However, the conduct
of an insurrectional or secessionist movement, which becomes the new government of a state, is considered an act of that state under international
law.' 91 The reason for this is the continuity between the insurrectional
92
movement and the new organization of the state.'
It is important to note that the factual conduct and not the legal
breach is attributed. 93 The example of the Northern Alliance's child
soldiers demonstrates the importance of this point. The Northern Alliance
is now part of the government of Afghanistan. Accordingly, its conduct as
an insurrectional movement - the use of child soldiers - is attributed to the
state of Afghanistan, which is therefore responsible for a breach of Article
24 of the ICCPR. Whether the Northern Alliance itself breached its own
obligations (under the law of internal armed conflict or customary human
rights law applicable to armed groups governing territory) is irrelevant. Instead, the state of Afghanistan is legally treated as if it itself had used child
soldiers at the time when the Northern Alliance used them.
189 Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Austl., Communication No. 120/1998, Comm. Against Torture, 22d Sess., 6.5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (May 25, 1999).
190 Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 112. See also Alfred L.W. Short v. Iran, 16
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 76, 85 (1987).
191Draft Articles, supra note 114, art. 10. See also Fr. Co. of Venez. R.R., 10
R.I.A.A. 285 (Fr.-Venez. Mixed Cl. Comm'n 1905); Dix, 9 R.I.A.A. 119, 120
(Am.-Venez. Mixed Cl. Comm'n 1903); Bolivar Ry. Co., 9 R.I.A.A. 445, 453 (Br.Venez. Mixed Cl. Comm'n 1903); Puerto Cabello & Valencia Ry. Co., 9 R.I.A.A.
510, 513 (Br.-Venez. Mixed Cl. Comm'n 1903); Pinson v. Mex., 5 R.I.A.A. 327,
353 (Fr.-Mex. Gen. Cl. Comm'n 1928). Cf IAN BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY
1178 (1983); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 554 (Robert Jennings & Arthur

Watts, eds., 9th ed., 1992).
192 Draft Articles, supra note 114, at

113. For a critique of this justification, see

BROWNLIE, supra note 191, at 178; Hessbruegge, supra note 109, at 273.
193 Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 111-18 (consistently referring to the

tion of "conduct" and not of "breaches").
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Holding a state governed by successful insurrectionists or secessionists responsible for the latter's previous conduct produces a remarkable
result. The insurrectional or secessionist movement is legally not bound by
human rights law. Yet, the Damocles sword of being held retrospectively
responsible in case it succeeds in its stated goal of becoming a state government is looming over the movement. Using this argument, human rights
activists can condemn atrocities by such groups, without having to forego
the language of human rights and venture off into the realm of international
humanitarian law.
B.

Responsibilityfor Failure to Exercise Due Diligence

Whereas the principles of attribution are rules of general international law that are merely applied to human rights law, responsibility for
failure to exercise due diligence in protecting individuals arises from specific rules of human rights law. The rationale for holding the state responsible is not its complicity in the non-state conduct, but the failure to protect
against it. 194 The principle has been drawn from the law governing the protection of foreign nationals. 195 The key question raised by the due diligence
principle is the same in both bodies of law: To what extent may and must a
state interfere in the relations that non-state actors have with one another?
Writing in the late 19th century, Sir William Edward Hall considered to what extent a state must provide itself with the means of preventing
injury to foreigners. He argued that a state cannot be asked to use the most
efficient means to protect foreigners, because it would otherwise be required to resort to "a completely despotic government" which "can make its
will felt immediately for any purpose."' 196 In order to justify why the most
efficient (i.e. "despotic" to Hall) measures of protection did not have to be
employed, Hall argued that a community had the "right to regulate its life in
its own way ....

All that can be asked is that the best provision for the

fulfillment of international duties shall be made which is consistent with the
character of the national institutions ...

197

The issues are the same in the context of human rights law. The
very purpose of human rights law is to prevent a "completely despotic government." For this reason, there have to be limits on the state's obligations
Dinah L. Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs, and the Responsibility of
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 25-26 (1989/1990).
195 Stephanie Farrior, State Responsibilityfor Human Rights Abuses by Non-State
Actors, 92 AM. Soc'Y INT'L PROC. 299, 302 (1998).
196 WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 221 (5th ed.
1904).
197 Id.
194

States, 13
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to protect one individual from another, because any state interference for
the benefit of the former curbs the latter's freedom to act. Furthermore,
human rights law does not prescribe a particular social or economic system.
In that sense, the community of citizens that unites in the state retains the
"right to regulate its life in its own way." By requiring the state to protect
non-state actors from certain conduct of other non-state actors, human
rights are introduced into the non-state realm through the backdoor. Theoretically, almost any interaction between non-state actors could be framed
as a human rights issue and subjected to the scrutiny of international human
rights bodies. An all-embracing human rights law could become the
blueprint for the perfect society (as perceived by the respective interpreter)
or, more likely, meaningless. The boundaries of the state's responsibility to
protect human rights from non-state conduct with due diligence must therefore be carefully delineated.
Three issues merit discussion. It needs to be considered whether
diagonal obligations to protect flow from every human right or only from a
selected few. To the extent that a state has a diagonal obligation towards a
human rights holder, the state's ambit of responsibility has to be demarcated. Finally, it needs to be ascertained whether the mere failure to protect
with due diligence brings about a human rights violation or whether there
has to be an injury resulting from the failure to protect.
1. Which Human Rights Contain Diagonal Obligations?
States are doubtlessly under a duty to protect non-state actors from
one another where this is expressly required by human rights treaties. For
instance, CERD Article 2(d) requires state parties "to prohibit and bring to
an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization."
Certain racist groups or activities are to be penalized (CERD Article 4).
CERD Article 6 requires the state parties to assure effective protection from
racial discrimination and to assure the individual's right to seek damages if
it nevertheless occurs. In L.K. v. The Netherlands, the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination held that these norms require the state
to take concrete action when confronted with private racial discrimination. 198 L.K. and a friend had wanted to visit a house for which a lease had
been offered to him and his family. A group of street residents told him
L.K. v. Neth., Communication No. 4/1991, U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/42/D/4/1991 (Mar. 16, 1993). See also
A. YilmazDogan v. Neth., Communication No. 1/1984, U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/36/D/l/1984 (1987) (concerning the racially discriminatory termination of an employment contract).
198
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that they wanted no more foreigners to move in, threatened to burn his
house and damage his car and ultimately filed a petition with the local authorities against granting L.K. the lease. The police only prepared a report
one and a half months after the incident and the courts dismissed an action
that would have required the state to prosecute the authors of the petition
for racial discrimination. The Committee found that the police and the judiciary had not afforded the applicant effective protection and remedies in
accordance with CERD Article 6.199
The types of anti-discriminatory measures the state must take vary,
depending on the specific instance of racial discrimination. One should
bear in mind that the state only has to end racial discrimination "by all
appropriatemeans." Therefore, the state is not always obliged to directly
interfere in individual cases of discrimination. For instance, the state would
not have to stop an individual person from taking the race of another person
into account when choosing whom to marry or whose donation to accept
from a sperm bank, even if the individual acts out of sheer prejudice. That
there are areas exempt from direct state interference, follows also from
CERD Article 7, which requires state parties "to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the field of education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial
discrimination."
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) contains provisions about gender discrimination
that are comparable to the norms contained in CERD. State parties undertake "to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women by any person, organization or enterprise" (CEDAW Article 2(e)).
Subsequent articles mention specific areas requiring state interference, such
as sexual exploitation (CEDAW Article 6) or the participation in "non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country" (CEDAW Article 7(c)).200 CEDAW also
implicitly recognizes the limits of direct state interference in specific types
of conduct in Article 5, which obliges state parties to work towards modifying "the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and [practices based on
199 L.K. v. Neth., Communication No. 4/1991, U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, 6.7, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/42/D/4/1991 (Mar. 16, 1993).
200 See also specific recommendations contained in General Recommendation 19,
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 11 th
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prejudice or gender stereotypes]." The Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) also contains a number of provisions requiring the state to
protect against certain private conduct such as physical or mental abuse
(Article 19 (1)) or the trafficking of children (Article 35).201
In some cases, the duty to protect against certain non-state conduct
can even extend beyond the territory of a state. Article 4(2) of the Optional
Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, 20 2 which requires states to prevent,
where feasible, the recruitment and use of child soldiers by armed non-state
actors, is such a case. The Protocol does not contain a territorial limitation.
Instead, the Protocol's preamble condemns "the recruitment, training and
use within and across national borders of children in hostilities [emphasis
added]." Indeed, the factual scope of Article 4(2) would be rather narrow if
only applied to armed non-state actors operating within a state party's territory. Strong states will never tolerate that armed non-state actors operate in
their territory. On the other hand, weaker states might tolerate the formation of non-state militias within their borders, but, owing to their weakness,
it is rarely feasible for them to prevent these militias from using child
soldiers. By definition, the conduct of insurrectionary movements cannot
be controlled by the territorial state.
The extraterritorial ambit of the Optional Protocol on Children in
Armed Conflict does not require a state to become actively engaged in another country's internal conflict merely because the warring parties use
child soldiers. However, where a state party to the Protocol has an operational relationship with a non-state actor - like the United States (which is
not a party to the Protocol) had with the Afghan Northern Alliance - it is
obliged to use its leverage to curb the recruitment and use of child soldiers.
Simply turning a blind eye to the practice is not enough.
General human rights treaties also contain a number of provisions,
which expressly require state interference in private conduct. ICESCR Article 10(3) stipulates that children and young persons should be protected
from economic and social exploitation. 20 3 ICCPR Article 6(1) obliges states
See also Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 44th Sess.,
arts. 18(l), 21(c) and (d), 32, 33, 34 and 36 (1989). On duties with regard to
trafficking, see also the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. GAOR,
55th Sess., Annex II, Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001).
202 Convention on the Rights of the Child in the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
203 ICESCR, supra note 38.
201
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to protect the right to life by law. 20 4 This obligation entails the duty to
prevent and punish crimes against life. 20 5 In Dermit Barbato v. Uruguay
the HRC held the state responsible for a prisoner's death. It was not clear
whether Dermit Barbato committed suicide, was driven to suicide or killed
by others. Nevertheless, the Committee concluded that the Uruguayan authorities were responsible either by act or by omission for not taking adequate measures to protect Dermit Barbato's life. 20 6 From ICCPR Article 6,
the Committee also deduced a duty to prevent and investigate the disappearance of persons, since the disappearance is in many cases only a prelimi20 7
nary step before the victim is murdered.
An obligation to prevent and punish non-state conduct can also be
deduced from the wording of ICCPR Article 8, which stipulates: "No one
shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall
be prohibited. ' 20 Articles 17(2) and 24(1) of the ICCPR also contain lan20 9
guage indicating duties to protect.
ICCPR Article 20 requires the state to prohibit "any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence" as well as "propaganda of war." The mere prohibition of the said acts is insufficient; appropriate sanctions in case of
violation have to be provided for.210 However, ICCPR Article 20 only adICCPR, supra note 9. See also ECHR, supra note 38, at art. 2(1); ACHR,
supra note 38, at art. 4(1).
205 See also General Comment 6, Article 6,Human Rights Comm., 16th Sess., at 6
(1982), in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\I\Rev.1,
at 6 (1994). See also Kindler v. Canada, App. 470/91 (HRC, 1993) (separate opinion of Mr. Wennergren, as quoted in SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA
CASTA, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 130
(2000)).
206 Dernit Barbato & Dermit Barbato v. Uru., Communication No. 84/1981, U.N.
GAOR, Human Rights Comm., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/38/40, at 124, para. 9.2
(1983).
207 Id. at para. 4.
208 ICCPR, supra note 9. See MANFRED NOwAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 147 (1993).
209 ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 17(2) ("Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks."); id. at art. 24(1) ("Every child shall
have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national
or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are
required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.").
210 General Comment 11, Article 20 Human Rights Comm. 19th Sess., at 12
(1983), in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDA204
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dresses propaganda for illegal wars of aggression. 21' Thus the provision
opens interesting possibilities for indirect challenges to wars that violate
international law. Were the countries, which formed the "coalition of the
willing" against Iraq, under a human rights obligation to restrain and sanction those segments of their private media, which cheered the war on so
emphatically?
States also have duties to show due diligence in providing protection, even if this is not expressly required by a specific human rights norm.
All six general human rights treaties create positive obligations to control
certain non-state activities. 212 ICCPR Article 2 provides that states not only
undertake to "respect" the rights in the Covenant, but also that they "ensure" those rights to all those within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction.213 The term "respect" is understood to create duties of
forbearance. 2 14 These negative obligations require the state and its agents to
"refrain from restricting the exercise of [Covenant] rights. ' 215 Conversely,
the word "ensure" refers to duties of performance. 216 One aspect of these
duties of performance is the state's obligation to protect non-state actors
from one another in certain cases.
The same two-pronged distinction of duties can be found in the
other general human rights treaties. The American Convention on Human
Rights contains an undertaking to "respect" and to "ensure" rights (Article
1(1)). The latter phrase gives rise to protective duties, a fact that the InterTIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\I\Rev.1
(1994).
211 Id.
212 Farrior, supra note 195, at 301. Cf NOWAK, supra note 208, at 36-37; JOSEPH
ET AL., supra note 205, at 24.
213 ICCPR, supra note 9.
214 NOWAK, supra note 208, at 36. It is not entirely clear whether the original
drafts actually intended to create this two-pronged set of human rights duties. The

original draft had only provided for an obligation to "ensure" rights; presumably
this referred to duties of forbearance. The Human Rights Commission only inserted the words "to respect" after a requisite motion by France and Lebanon had
passed without dissent in 1950. Id. at 29. This might have been done to change the
meaning of "ensure" to now create duties of performance. In the alternative, the
insertion of "respect" was only meant to reinforce the aspect of forbearance. Given
that the travaux prparatoiresare only a subsidiary means to determine the meaning of a treaty (see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331), the issue does not have any
bearing on the position of current human rights law.
215 NOWAK, supra note 208, at 36.
216 Id. at 36-37.
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American Commission recognized as early as 1975.217 The African Charter
of Human and Peoples Rights obliges member states to "recognize" the
Charter provisions and to "adopt ... measures to give effect to them." The
African Commission of Human and Peoples Rights concluded that Article 1
of the African Charter creates duties to protect when it held Chad responsible for failing to secure the safety and the liberty of its citizens, and to
conduct investigations into murders.2 18 The wording of the ECHR is not
quite as explicit, since the Convention only requires state parties to "secure"
the Convention rights to everyone within their jurisdiction. But this term
has been read by the European Court of Human Rights to embrace both
negative and positive duties, including diagonal obligations to protect on
numerous occasions.2 19 Finally, Article 2 of the ICESCR stipulates that
each state party "undertakes to take steps . . . with a view to achieving

progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant." The wording is sufficiently broad to embrace duties to protect.
The fact that protective duties are contained in the major human
rights treaties still does not answer the initial question: Which human rights
contain obligations to protect and which ones do not? A number of rights
clearly cannot contain diagonal obligations, since the harm to the right has
to be specifically caused by state action. These are typically rights which
aim to curb the state's unique power to make law in the form of abstract
laws, or concrete judicial and administrative decisions. The rights of the
accused in the criminal justice process belong to this group. The same is
true for the right to recognition as a person before the law (ICCPR Article
16) or the right of equal access to the public service (ICCPR Article
220
25(c)).
Informe Anual de la Comisi6n Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 1975, Organization of American States, OEA/Ser.L/VJII.37, Doc. 20 (June 28, 1976), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/75sp/sec.2b.htm. See also Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Guatemala, Organization of American States, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53, Doc. 21, Chapter II (Right to Life), Topic B, 10
(Oct. 13, 1981), available at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Guatemala8leng/
TOC.htm. Cf Velisquez Rodriguez v. Hond., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
164-82 (July 29, 1988).
218 Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertes v. Chad, Comm.
No. 74/92, paras. 19-23 (African Comm. Human & Peoples' Rights, undated).
217

219

See, e.g., Young, James & Webster v. U.K., 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20

(1981) (concerning dismissal of British Rail employees for refusing to join a trade
union).
Cf Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 6, at 967 (considering de lege ferenda which
human rights ought to attach to transnational corporations).
220
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Leaving these specific exceptions aside, international human rights
tribunals and commissions have found obligations to protect in an array of
human rights norms, covering virtually the entire spectrum of protected
rights. Delgado Paez v. Colombia concerned a teacher who was subjected
to death threats and physical attacks by non-state actors and ultimately fled
the country after unknown killers murdered another teacher. The UN
Human Rights Committee found that the author's right to security (ICCPR
Article 9(1)) had been violated because Colombia had failed to ensure effective protection. 221 On the same legal principle, Algeria was reprimanded
for tolerating vigilante groups. 222 Other states have been censured for failing to prevent customary practices of female genital mutilation, which the
Committee has found to be cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (see
ICCPR Article 7).223
A duty to curb discrimination in the non-state sphere emerges from
ICCPR Articles 2(1) and 26. In Nahlik v. Austria, the author of the complaint charged that he was discriminated against by a collective bargaining
agreement. The agreement was governed by private law and its content was
exclusively determined by the contracting parties. The Committee took the
view that "the courts of States parties are under an obligation to protect
individuals against discrimination, whether this occurs within the public
sphere or among private parties in the quasi-public sector of, for example,
'224
employment.
With regard to the right of free expression (ICCPR Article 19), the
Committee notes that "because of the development of modern mass media,
William Eduardo Delgado Pez v. Colombia, Comm. 195/85, U.N. GAOR,
Human Rights. Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 43, para. 5.6, U.N. Doc. A/45/
40 (1990).
221

222

Concluding Comments on Algeria (1998), U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm.,

at para. 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 63 (1998).
Concluding Comments on Sudan (1997), U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm.,
at para. 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C.79/Add.85 (1997); Concluding Comments on Senegal (1997), U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm., at 106, para. 12, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add. (1997). Cf. General Comment 20, Article 7, Human Rights
Comm., 44th Sess., at 30 (1992), in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND
223

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY

Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 (1994);

BODIES, U.N.

supra note 205, at 130.
224 Franz Nahlik v. Austria, Comm. 608/1995, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights
Comm., at para. 8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/608/1995 (1996). Cf. Concluding
Comments on Chile (1999), U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm., at para. 23, U.N.
JOSEPH ET AL.,

Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 104 (1999); Concluding Comments on Mauritius (1996),

U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm., at para. 23, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 60
(1996).
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effective measures are necessary to prevent such control of the media as
would interfere with the right of everyone to freedom of expression ... "22
ICCPR Article 27 places an obligation on state parties to protect the
existence and exercise of the individual's minority rights against their denial by non-state actors within the state party.2 26 In Hopu and Bessert v.
France, the Human Rights Committee considered the private construction
of a hotel complex on government owned-land to be a violation of the two
ethnic Polynesian applicants' human rights, since the hotel was to be constructed on a traditional burial ground. Confronted with a French reservation to ICCPR Article 27, the Committee held that France had failed to
effectively protect the applicants' family and private life in accordance with
ICCPR Articles 17 and 23.227 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has taken the view that the right to food, the right to water,
2 28
and the right to take part in cultural life contain obligations to protect.
The jurisprudence of European human rights bodies has found obligations to protect in the right to form and join trade unions 229 and the right
General Comment 10, Article 19 Human Rights Comm., 19th Sess., at 11
(1983), in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\ \Rev. 1
(1994).
226 General Comment 23, Article 27 Human Rights Comm., 50th Sess., at 38
225

(1994), in

COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDA-

TIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES,

U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. 1

(1994). See also Lansman et al. v. Finland, Comm. 511/1992, U.N. GAOR,
Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994) (upholding the
permission given to a private company to operate a quarry, even though the quarry
disturbed traditional Sami reindeer herding).
227 Francis Hopu & Tepoaitu Bessert v. France, Communication No. 549/1993,
U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm., 60th Sess., at para. 10.3 (1997), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev. 1.
228 See General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), U.N. ESCOR,
20th Sess., Agenda Item 7, para. 19, [27], U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999); General Comment 15, The Right to Water, U.N. ESCOR, 29th Sess., Agenda Item 3, at
paras. 23-24, [24], U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002); Concluding Observations on
Iran (1993), U.N. ESCOR, para. 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/7 (1993) (urging Iran to
take action against fatwahs of religious authorities that call for violent attacks on
Salman Rushdie). For further references, cf. Chirwa, supra note 162, at 18-26.
229 Young, James & Webster v. U.K., 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1981). See
also Cheall v. U.K., App. No. 10550/83, 42 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 178,
186 (1985); National Union of Belgian Police v. Belg., App. No. 4464/70, 19 Eur.
H.R. Rep. In 48-49 (1975) (Commission report).
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to privacy and family life.2 30 The same holds true for the right to free assembly. In Plattform "Arzte flr das Leben" v. Austria,231 protesters intensely disturbed the demonstration of an anti-abortion group. The
European Court noted that while the right to free assembly contained protective duties the state had a margin of appreciation in choosing the mea2 32
sures to fulfill these duties.
The Inter-American Court held in the Veldsquez Rodriguez Case,
which concerned a case of abduction and murder by a private death-squad,
that the individual's right to physical integrity puts the state under an obligation to protect the individual from private violence. 233 In the Awas Tingi
Community case, an indigenous community complained that Nicaragua had
not demarcated the communal lands of the Community or adopted effective
measures to ensure the property rights of the Community to its ancestral
lands and natural resources. With a view to Article 21 of the American
Convention (right to property), the Court held:
[T]he members of the Awas Tingni Community have the
right that the State
a) carry out the delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the
territory belonging to the Community; and
b) abstain from carrying out, until that delimitation, demarcation, and titling have been done, actions that might
lead the agents of the State itself, or third parties acting
with its acquiescence or its tolerance, to affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of the property located in
the geographical area where the members of the Com23 4
munity live and carry out their activities.
X and Y v. Neth., 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1985) (concerning sexual
abuse of a mentally handicapped girl in a private nursing home); Velosa Barreto v.
Port., 334 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1995) (considering whether a family currently living in cramped space had the right to terminate the lease of a tenant living
in a house that the family inherited). See also L6pez Ostra v. Spain, 303-C Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) [ 52-57 (1995) (concerning the building of a contaminated plant
with state subsidies); Guerra v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 58 (concerning a private fertiliser plant that was potentially dangerous and polluting); Von Hannover v.
F.R.G., 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (concerning paparazzi photos).
231 Plattform "Arzte fUr das Leben" v. Austria, 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
232 Id. at 12.
230

Velisquez Rodrfguez v. Hond., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, [ 175-76
(July 29, 1988).
234 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicar., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 79, 153 (Aug. 31, 2001). This case built upon the jurisprudence devel233
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Destruction of and displacement from ancestral lands was also at the heart
of an important recent decision of the African Commission, which concerned ruthless oil exploration by the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation in collaboration with the Nigerian government in the Niger Delta, the
home region of the Ogoni people. The Commission found that Nigeria had
violated human rights inter alia because it failed to protect the Ogoni's
right to health (Article 16 of the Banjul Charter) and to a clean environment
(Article 24 of the Banjul Charter) from being impaired by Shell's exploration activities. 235 Moreover, the Court found that the Ogoni's right to selfdetermination, which entails a right to free disposition of their wealth and
natural resources (Article 21 of the Banjul Charter), has been insufficiently
protected from encroachments by Shell. 236
An analysis of the case law does not reveal a pattern indicating
which human rights contain duties to protect and which do not. Instead,
every human right seems capable of producing duties to protect. This raises
the question of whether any potential frustration of behavior otherwise protected by relevant human rights creates an obligation on the state to implement protective counter-measures. Is one really dealing with a human
rights issue if someone makes the conscious decision not to invite another
person to dinner because the other person does not share his/her religion or
gender?
Recently, the UN Human Rights Committee noted that not all
human rights entail diagonal obligations:
...

the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Cov-

enant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are
protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment

oped by the Inter-American Commission sixteen years earlier in the Yanomami
Case. Yanomami v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 12/85, OEA/
Ser.L./V/II.66, Doc. 10 (Oct. 1, 1985). The Commission held that Brazil had
breached the rights to health and life of this indigenous community's members,
since it failed to prevent settlers from moving in masses to the Brazilian Amazon
reserve and thereby brought disease, violence, and destruction to the Yanomami.
Id.

Social and Economic Rights Action Center for Economic and Social Rights v.
Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, African Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights,
para. 52 (2001).
235

236

Id. paras. 55-57.
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of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to appli237
cation between private persons or entities.

Unfortunately, the Committee failed to develop general principles discerning when a human right creates a duty to protect from non-state conduct.
Several approaches could be imagined to fill this jurisprudential gap. One
approach would be to limit the protective ambit of a human right by balancing it with the countervailing human rights of the non-state actor against
whom the states would protect. Some 40 years ago, Louis Henkin outlined
such an approach for the right not to be discriminated against on racial
grounds under the U.S. Constitution, when he commented on the U.S. Supreme Court Case of Shelley v. Kramer.238 In this case, the Court refused to
enforce a restrictive private covenant which provided that a certain plot of
land was not to be conveyed to black persons. Henkin took the view that
the state is responsible for racial discrimination, if it could prevent, should
prevent, and fails to prevent the discrimination. 239 In other words, he argued that a diagonal obligation to protect against discrimination by nonstate actors existed under the U.S. Constitution.
When should the state intervene? Henkin found that the discriminator's constitutional rights of liberty and privacy had to be balanced with
the victim's right to be protected against non-state discrimination.2 40 Henkin suggested that the sphere in which the discrimination occurs determines
which right prevails. In certain situations, the discriminator retains the right
to be "whimsical, sentimental, irrational, [and] capricious."24 1 However,
where the discrimination is organized, public and prominent or where the
private individuals involved are only loosely associated and have no intimate ties, the right to be protected against discrimination is likely to prevail. 242 Such an approach could also be applied in international human
rights law. One could find that the state's diagonal obligation to protect is
more likely to prevail, the more the discrimination moves into the "organized, public and prominent" sphere. In fact, the UN Human Rights ComGeneral Comment No. 31 on Article 2 of the Covenant: The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the CovenantU.N. GAOR,
Human Rights Comm., at para. 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev (2004) (emphasis added).
238 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
239 Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kramer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PENN.
L. REv. 473, 483 (1962).
240 Id. at 487-88.
241 Id. at 488.
242 Id. at 496.
237

2005

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

mittee's finding in the Nahlik case, that the state has to prevent
discrimination in the "quasi-public sector," 243 seems akin to Henkin's approach. Along the same lines, one could delineate the scope of CERD Article 6 from that of CERD Article 7. The more private or intimate a certain
behavior is, the more the obligation changes from a duty to interfere in the
concrete case to a general duty to educate against prejudices.
In many cases involving other human rights, similar countervailing
rights can be found. In Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben," for instance, one
could argue that the Plattform's right to demonstrate was limited by the
protesters' right to counter-demonstrate. In Hannover v. Germany, the
Court explicitly balanced the freedom of the press against the applicant's
right not to be photographed in her private life, but upheld the duty to pro244
tect the latter in that case.
However, there are situations where this approach seems rather artificial. An untalented aspiring artist is booed of the stage by a drunken
crowd. Did the state fail to protect the artist's right to take part in cultural
life (ICESCR Article 15 (1))? Or is the state only vindicated in refusing to
protect him because it chose to respect the crowd's countervailing right to
free expression? What if a shop owner prohibits a group of teenagers to
assemble (loiter, in his opinion) in the store? The ICCPR does not protect
the right to property. Does one have to endeavor to find a countervailing
customary right to property flowing from Article 17 of the Universal Declaration to solve the issue? It seems that the discourse of human rights is
misplaced in these situations and should remain separate, lest it be trivialized. It is therefore necessary to construct a theory to determine in which
instances there are no duties to protect from the very outset.
Clapham has made an attempt to construct such a theory. Although
his theory is based on the assumption that human rights are horizontally
applicable, it can be adapted to the question of diagonal application.
Clapham finds that dignity and democracy are the values which underlie
human rights provisions. 245 His definition of democracy is a broad one. It
entails not only fair elections, but also participation, accountability, representativeness, pluralism, tolerance, broadmindedness, freedom of expression and protection of minorities. 246 Dignity requires that "everyone's
humanity... be respected" 247 and protected from indignities such as killing,
torture, slavery, discrimination, and so forth. Dignity also entails that "the
243
244
245
246
247

See supra note 194 and accompanying text.

Von Hannover v. F.R.G., 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
CLAPHAM, supra note 19, at 145-49.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148.

58.
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conditions for everyone's self-fulfillment .

.

.

[are] created and pro-

tected." 248 This aspect is attacked where "the right to associate, to make
love, to take part in social life, to express one's intellectual, artistic, or cultural ideas, to enjoy a decent standard of living and health care" are denied.249 Based on his theory, Clapham argues, for example, that a group of
protesters must not be prevented by other private actors from demonstrating
in a private shopping precinct, as that would thwart democracy. 2 0 Applied
to a model of diagonal obligations, this would mean that the state has to
protect the protesters' right to demonstrate against private interference.
However, according to Clapham, democracy is not threatened when a group
of witches demand to speak at a Christian prayer meeting is rejected. 21
Clapham argues, only where the witches are denied the right to speak at all
52
would one be dealing with a denial of dignity.2
Clapham poses the right question - What factors determine whether
the state has to intervene in non-state relations? - but, to my mind, he provides a flawed answer. As the foundational stone of human rights, the concept of dignity is all-embracing, which makes it an inappropriate tool of
analysis. Every human right has dignity as one of its underlying values,
even the most "democratic" of human rights such as the rights to participate
in elections or to speak freely. Democracy is ultimately a tool to preserve
individual dignity. Clapham's focus on "dignity" therefore creates a safety
net that catches all cases in which the democracy principle does not generate a duty to protect but it seems nevertheless appropriate to assume one.
No clarity is gained. In addition, some of the strongest denials of dignity
occur in areas where most people would find that the state has no business
to interfere. Some of the greatest derisions and humiliations human beings
can suffer are intractable to human rights. A person would be deeply humiliated if he were to be rejected as a lover or spouse solely because of his
race. Yet, human rights language is incapable of addressing these intimate
indignities, which are hurtful precisely because they are so intimate.
Building on both Clapham and Henkin, I propose a different framework of analysis. To my mind, two separate categories of human rights can
be distinguished: existential rights and social good rights. The distinction
does not imply a ranking of importance. Human rights are indivisible. I
deem the categorization only important to explain why certain types of
rights produce more extensive duties to protect than others.
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Id. at 149.
Id. at 145-46.
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Existential human rights are those which protect the individual's
very physical existence. Comprised of the rights to physical security and
rights to subsistence (the rights necessary to ensure the individual's bare
survival), this category corresponds roughly with what Henry Shue has
called basic rights. 253 Recognizing that civil and political rights on the one
hand and socio-economic rights on the other hand are interdependent and
intertwined, 254 existential rights are drawn from both sets of rights. To the
extent that they ensure the mere subsistence of the individual, the rights to
food, health, clothing or housing are existential rights. So are the rights to
life and physical integrity or the rights to be free from torture, slavery or
arbitrary arrest.
Two factors distinguish these rights from others. Their enjoyment
is a necessary precondition for the enjoyment of all other rights.2 5 5 This
does not make them more valuable or intrinsically more satisfying than
some other human rights, but may explain why these rights tend to supersede other rights if a choice has to be made between conflicting human
rights. 256 More importantly, the denial of an existential right always constitutes an act of cruelty.
Whereas existential rights protect the human being's individual existence, social good rights protect the human being as a member of society.
For the individual, these rights secure fair access to social goods or at least
SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSTANCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FoREIGN
POLICY 8-30 (2d. ed. 1996). In a later passage, Shue makes the case that a right to
minimum participation would also be a basic right. Id. at 65-88. He argues that for
someone to have a right to enjoy the basic goods of security and subsistence there
needs to be social arrangements to safeguard this right. Therefore, Shue contends,
basic rights cannot exist in an absolute dictatorship that lacks any form of popular
participation. Because there are no social arrangements to safeguards basic rights,
the substantive entitlement provided through these rights cannot be demanded as of
right but the entitlement is only granted out of an act of dictatorial benevolence.
However, this argument is flawed in the context of international human rights law,
because the obligations corresponding to these rights are not only owed to the entitled individual but erga omnes to all states. See Barcelona Traction, Light, and
Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ LEXIS 2 (Feb. 5). Due to this erga omnes
character, international arrangements to safeguard basic rights exist, even where
domestic social arrangements are completely absent. A right to participation is not
a condition sine qua non to the existence of other international human rights.
254 See Craig Scott, The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights
Norms: Towards A Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human
Rights, 27 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 769 (1989).
255 SHUE, supra note 253, at 30.
256 See id. at 20.
253 HENRY
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ensure participation in determining their distribution. The term "social
goods" is used in the widest sense here, encompassing any material or immaterial benefit the state, society or its individual members can provide.
Socio-economic rights are obviously access rights, but the concept embraces all rights, except existential human rights. For instance, the right to
free speech may ensure access to social goods, e.g. if the speaker is aiming
to gain the social good of fame by expressing himself. It also ensures a say
in the distribution of social goods. Even the right to privacy is a social
good human right, since the privilege of being left alone is a good that
society can generate. The right not to be discriminated against is also a
right that is ensuring access to social goods. It is a right directed against the
abuse of power and not a right primarily concerned with the direct affront to
dignity constituted by the act of discrimination. What offends the discrimination victim's dignity is not really the discriminatory conduct but the underlying prejudice that reveals itself through the conduct. The prejudice
itself, however, remains intractable to legal commands. Human rights law
can only ensure that the prejudice will not hamper the victim's fair access to
the social good he or she desires.
Some human rights are partially existential and partially social
good rights, and which protective duties emanate from them will depend on
the context. The right to health, for example, is an existential human right
to the extent that it protects from the gravest, life-threatening infringements
of one's health. To the extent that it seeks to ensure and promote general
physical and mental well-being, it is a social good right. At times, aspects
of an existential right can be duplicated in a social good right. Where the
right to free assembly protects from violent interference with a demonstration, the right to physical integrity is also concerned. In these cases, the
principles applicable to existential rights prevail.
Existential and social good rights contain different sets of protective duties. If non-state conduct threatens to frustrate existential rights, the
state always has an obligation to adopt protective measures. 257 The state
cannot make a conscious decision to tolerate the injurious behavior. Firstly,
this follows from the victim's perspective. In the realm of existential rights,
it makes no difference for the victim whether the injury is inflicted in the
David Kinley and Junko Tadaki have considered the related question: What
human rights duties ought to bind transnational corporations? They come to the
similar conclusion that "core rights," namely the rights to life, liberty and physical
integrity, ought to apply to non-state actors, whereas other rights ought to only be
made applicable to transnational corporations where corporate misconduct has a
direct impact on human rights holders ("direct impact rights"). See Kinley &
Tadaki, supra note 6, at 966-69.
257
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intimate/private or in the prominent/public sphere. Domestic violence requires no less protection than violence against the participants of a political
rally. Secondly, one does not have to fear that the protective measure unduly infringes upon the freedom of the attacker. He is prima facie in the
wrong, since the denial of an existential right always constitutes an act of
cruelty. Cruelty is primafacie wrong because there are natural duties not to
injure one another or to inflict unnecessary suffering; these duties hold true
between persons irrespective of their relationship. 258
Two clarifications must be added. The obligation to protect existential rights is not absolute. The state can consciously abstain from protecting these rights, when protection would infringe upon stronger
countervailing rights. For instance, the state does not have to take protective measures against killing in self-defense to the extent that the attacked
person's rights prevail over the attacker's right to life. The classical case of
contention is the case of abortion: Is the woman's right to privacy so strong
that the state may consciously abstain from protecting the life of the unborn
child? In deciding which right trumps the other, the state has a margin of
appreciation. Due to the importance of existential human rights, though,
this margin is small.
Secondly, it must be clarified that we are only dealing with the
question of whether a state has a duty to protect or whether it can consciously decide to abstain from doing anything. We are not yet dealing
with what protective measures a state has to take. Naturally, a state cannot
be obliged to prevent all murders or acts of domestic violence. All it can be
required to do is to take reasonable and appropriate measures to the extent
of its capacity. This is the issue of the ambit of state responsibility. It will
259
be discussed below.
Social good human rights only give rise to obligations in the nonstate sphere under certain circumstances. In some cases, the state retains a
margin of appreciation to decide not to interfere - even if protective measures are within its capacity. Two factors determine whether diagonal obligations flow from a social good right in a given situation. The first factor is
the nature of the social good. Access to some intangible, intimate social
goods (friendship, love, etc.) is granted in a manner that is inevitably
"whimsical, sentimental, irrational, capricious." This is the area, where the
human rights language of rights and obligations becomes inappropriate.
Conversely, the more tangible and public the social good becomes (e.g.
housing, employment, etc.) the more likely it is that diagonal obligations
will exist.
258 Cf JOHN RAwLS,
259

A

THEORY OF JUSTICE

115 (1971).

See infra notes 260-77 and accompanying text.
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The second factor derives from the fact that distribution of social
goods is a competitive process in a free society. People compete for political power, nice housing, good jobs, even friendship, and we accept that.
Human rights restraints on the state are, to a great extent, aimed at protecting this competition: The state's unique power to enforce its views by way
of legal sanction allows it too great of an opportunity to skew the competition in an abusive manner. For this reason, the state is the primary addressee of human rights law. A non-state actor does not have this unique
power and can only rely on a relative advantage in factual power to enforce
its view on another non-state actor. Therefore, one has to analyze the factual power relationship and determine to what extent it threatens one side's
autonomy: An obligation in the non-state sphere is more likely to exist the
more skewed the power balance is.260 If one person heckled a public
speaker in London's Hyde Park, we would accept that (despite the public
nature of the social good of political influence), because both can compete
for the social good of opinion leadership on the same footing. However, if
a great number of hecklers organized themselves to shut down one specific
speaker, this might be different because the relative distribution of factual,
vocal power skews the competition. Thus, whether a diagonal obligation to
protect a social good human right exists depends firstly on how tangible/
public the concerned social good is and secondly on how skewed the distribution of power between the competitors for that good is.
2.

Ambit of State Responsibility

Once it is established that there is an obligation to protect, the question is what measures have to be taken. This question relates to the ambit
of state responsibility. This ambit has two dimensions. The first dimension
is its extent. The state's human rights responsibility extends to everything
within its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the state's ambit of "judicial,
legislative, and administrative competence" and extends as a minimum to
the state territory. 261 International human rights bodies have held that a
state can also violate human rights if it exercises control over de jure or de
facto agents that are committing breaches abroad. 262 There is no reason
Cf. Raday, supra note 15, at 110; Eckart Klein, GrundrechtlicheSchutzpflicht
des Staates, 42 NEuE JtmISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1633 (1989). Klein proposes
to examine to what extent true voluntarism characterizes the relation between two
non-state actors in order to determine if a human right gives rise to a protective
duty in a certain situation.
260

261 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

301 (5th ed. 1998).

See Coard v. U.S., Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, 37
(1999); Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uru., Communication No. 52/1979, U.N. GAOR,
262
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why this principle of home state responsibility should not also apply to
diagonal obligations. A state might therefore have to take reasonable protective measures to prevent human rights abusive conduct by non-state actors that are based in its territory but commit the abuse in another state that
is incapable or unwilling to prevent the conduct itself.263 Thus, a developed
state might have to take reasonable measures to prevent one of its transnational corporations from engaging in human rights infringing conduct in a
developing state, if that developing state lacks the power, technical expertise or political will to fulfill its own diagonal obligations to protect. Given
that many states already successfully apply their antitrust, export control
and securities laws to the extraterritorial conduct of non-state actors, such
an obligation would not overburden developed states. 264 Furthermore, this
principle of a subsidiary home state responsibility would not unduly interfere with the sovereignty of the state, where the abusive conduct takes
place. The economic sanctions, which various states imposed against
Apartheid South Africa, set the precedent that international law permits a
state to direct its companies how, and even if, to do business in another
state. A strong case can therefore be made that diagonal human rights obligations ought to have an extraterritorial ambit of application. However,
there is, unfortunately, still little evidence that this is a recognized principle
265
of positive international law.
Apart from the ambit of responsibility's extent, there is a second
dimension, which one may call the ambit's depth. Protective duties are
duties of due diligence rather than duties of result, because human rights
law must not place an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. 266 Even though the state has a duty to protect human life, for example,
Human Rights Comm., at 88, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/l (1984); Lilian Celiberti de
Casariego v. Uru., Communication No. 56/1979, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights
Comm., at 92, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985); Loizidou v. Turk. (Preliminary
Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 23-24 (1995). Cf Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 64 (June 27); NOWAK, supra note
208, at 42, 682-83; Theodor Meron, Extraterritorialityof Human Rights Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1995).
263 Cf Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Linking State Responsibility for Certain
Harms Caused by CorporateNationals Abroad to Civil Recourse in the Legal Systems of Home States, in ScoTr, supra note 111, at 491.
264 See id. at 494.
265 See Sarah Joseph, An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of Multinational Enterprises, in KAMMINGA & ZIA-ZARII, supra note 95, at 75, 80. Cf
Chirwa, supra note 162, at 29.
266 See Osman v. U.K., 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R., 3124.
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it is not obliged to successfully prevent every single murder. 267 The state
does not have to do more than to take "reasonable and appropriate measures. '268 What is reasonable and appropriate must be determined on a
case-by-case basis bearing in mind the specific facts of the case. In
Platform "Arzte fiir das Leben" v. Austria, for instance, the European
Court of Human Rights found that the state had a wide margin of discretion
in the choice of means to be used in order to protect a demonstration. By
prohibiting the counter demonstrations and deploying a large number of
policemen as well as special riot-control units, when violence threatened to
break out, Austria had fulfilled its duty to protect, even though the counter
demonstrators still managed to throw eggs and clumps of grass at the
269
demonstrators.
In setting its protection priorities, the state has to take into account
the extent and intensity of the injury to be feared, the degree of probability
that the injury will happen, the extent to which the protective measure will
cost resources needed to fulfill other obligations, and the possible existence
of countervailing human rights that would be limited by the protective measure. A non-state threat to existential rights would generally require
stronger measures than one to social good human rights, not least because
the enjoyment of the former is the precondition for the enjoyment of the
latter. 270 Bleckmann has argued that legislators' margin of appreciation in
deciding upon protective measures ought to be greater than the administration's, since the parliament has been democratically legitimized. 27 1 This
Plattform "Arzte fir das Leben" v. Austria, 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12
(1988). The state is not even necessarily obliged to assign personal bodyguards to
someone even if that person has previously been subject to an assassination attempt. X. v. Ireland, 1973 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 388 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
268 William Eduardo Delgado Pdez v. Colombia, Communication 195/85, U.N.
GAOR, Human Rights Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 43, para. 5.6, U.N.
Doc. A/45/40 (1990) (1990), Annex IX, sect. D (pp. 43-49) reprinted in 1990
H.R.L.J. 313, at para. 5.5; Plattform "Arzte ffir das Leben" v. Austria, 139 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at para. 34 (1988). Cf Joaqufn David Herrera Rubio et al. v. Colombia, Communication No. 161/1983 (2 November 1987), U.N. GAOR, Human
Rights Comm., at 192, para. 10.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) (requiring "effective measures").
269 Plattform "Arzte ffir das Leben" v. Austria, 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12-13
(1988).
270 Cf JAGERS, supra note 25, at 171-72 (arguing that ius cogens norms give rise to
stricter protective duties).
271 Albert Bleckmann, Die Entwicklung staatlicher Schutzpflichten aus den
Freiheitender Europdischen Menschenrechtskonvention, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UM267
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309, 319 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 1994).

2005

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

idea, which is rooted in German constitutional jurisprudence, has no place
in international human rights law. In a democracy, the executive and administration are also democratically legitimized, either directly or indirectly.
What protective measures are reasonable and appropriate also depends on a state's capacity. Human rights law cannot ask the impossible
from a developing country. At the same time, it should demand more than
the lowest common denominator of possible protection from more capable
countries. Which protective measures are reasonable and appropriate will
therefore be affected by the resources a state has at its disposal. This raises
the problem, of course, that countries will be inclined to plead incapability
in order to dodge their obligations to protect. However, this problem is
mitigated by the fact that even a state with very few resources still has an
obligation to allocate those resources without discrimination. 272 A state
may not claim, for example, that it lacks the resources to take any measures
against domestic violence or female genital mutilation if it has dedicated
resources to protect against other forms of violence such as attacks by insurrectionary groups.
While human rights bodies have not recognized substantive duties
of result, they have identified specific process rights. In Veldsquez Rodrfguez, the Inter-American Court noted that a state has "to take reasonable
steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal
to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment
and to ensure the victim adequate compensation. '273 Thereafter, the Court
set out specific requirements for investigations into possible forced
disappearances:
[The investigation] must be undertaken in a serious manner
and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.
An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by
the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim
or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government ....
The duty to investigate facts of this type continues as long
as there is uncertainty about the fate of the person who has
disappeared. Even in the hypothetical case that those individually responsible for crimes of this type cannot be le272

Farrior, supra note 195, at 303.

Velsquez Rodrfguez v. Hond., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
29, 1988).
273

174 (July
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gally punished under certain circumstances, the State is
obligated to use the means at its disposal to inform the relatives of the fate of the victims and, if they have been killed,
274
the location of their remains.

Specific process rights are also emerging; such rights involve corporate activity that is detrimental to the enjoyment of human rights. 275 These process
rights aim to ensure that local populations confronted with harmful corporate activity are placed in a position to make informed decisions and have
their voices heard. The goal is to make certain that locals can compete on a
more equal footing against an adversary with greater factual power. In
Guerra v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights found that Italy had
violated its duty to protect family life by failing to provide essential information that would have enabled the applicants to assess the risks they and
their families assumed by continuing to live in the vicinity of an industrial
2 76
plant producing toxic emissions.
The African Commission recognized very similar process guarantees, when it considered the human rights violations arising from Shell's
ruthless oil exploration in Nigeria:
Government compliance with the spirit of Articles 16 and
24 of the African Charter must also include ordering or at
least permitting independent scientific monitoring of
threatened environments, requiring and publicizing environmental and social impact studies prior to any major industrial development, undertaking appropriate monitoring
and providing information to those communities exposed to
hazardous materials and activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their
277
communities.
274

Id. H 177, 181.

See Scott, supra note 111, at 582.
276 Guerra v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 60. Cf Linsman v. Fin., Communication No. 511/1992, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm., 9.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
52/D/511/1992 (Nov. 8, 1994). In the lAnsman case, the Committee considered
that the applicants had been consulted and their interests had been taken into account prior to the issuing of a quarrying permit, when it decided in favor of the
state.
277 Social and Economic Rights Action Center for Economic and Social Rights v.
Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, at para. 53 (African Comm'n on Human and Peoples'
6
Rights 2001), at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/155-9 b.html.
275
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The Inter-American Court's specific finding that Nicaragua has to delineate,
demarcate and grant title to the private property of the Awas Tingi indigenous community 278 is also no more than a process right. Titling the property does not create property rights for the Awas Tingi. It only confirms
and fixes them. By itself, it will not keep intruders out of the property.
However, it improves the Community's chance to have their voices heard in
legal and administrative proceedings concerning their property and the surrounding area.
3.

Injury and Causation

The failure to apply due diligence and adopt reasonable and appropriate protective measures in and of itself does not amount to a human
rights violation. There has to have been an injury to a rights-holder. That
does not mean that the rights-holder must have suffered tangible or intangible harm (material loss, emotional distress etc.). However, the rights holder
279
has to be directly affected by the failure to protect.
In principle, there must also be a causal relationship between the
failure to apply due diligence and the injury. 280 However, human rights
tribunals take into account that the failure to protect with due diligence
typically results from an omission and that the causality of omissions is
hard to ascertain. They seem to regard possible causality to be sufficient. X
& Y v. The Netherlands concerned sexual assault on a mentally handicapped girl. Due to a procedural gap in Dutch criminal law, the perpetrator
could not be prosecuted. In finding that the victim's right to privacy had
been violated, the Court dismissed the respondent state's arguments that the
assault would have occurred even had it been punishable. 28' Similarly, the
Inter-American Court construed a duty to investigate cases of forced disappearances from the right to life in Veldsquez Rodr(guez, even though the
victim had probably already been murdered and the investigation could thus
282
not have prevented the injury to the right to life.
278

See supra note 234.

279 WIESBROCK,

supra note 38, at 165-67, 182. Cf. Leo Hertzberg et al. v. Finland,

Comm. No. 61/1979 (2 April 1982), U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm., at 124,
paras. 9.3 & 10.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1982); Canepa v. Canada , Comm.

No 558/1993, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm., at para. 6.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/59/D/558/1993 (1997).
280 See Young, James & Webster v. U.K., 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1981);
WIESBROCK, supra note 38, at 175-77; Christenson, supra note 118, at 361-63.
281 X and Y v. Neth., 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1985).
[ 174-81
282 Velisquez Rodrfguez v. Hond., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
(July 29, 1988).
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CONCLUSION

The conduct of non-state actors can give rise to human rights violations to a greater extent than one would expect. Human rights law, interpreted in the light of general international law, applies to every private actor
that is endowed with state power in any form. It applies to private entities
that perform public functions and state-owned entities that are misused for
political purposes. The state can also incur human rights responsibility for
private conduct that it adopts as its own and for the conduct of de facto
agents or hierarchically structured agent groups, over whom it exercises
effective control. Finally, human rights responsibility also ensues where
non-state groups, such as insurrectionary movements, usurp state power.
The Westphalian paradigm of state responsibility has traditionally limited
international law to hold only the state (rather than the usurpers themselves)
responsible, but this short-coming is gradually being corrected as a customary norm emerges which extends human rights obligations also to non-state
actors governing territory.
Abuses of true non-state power are checked as well. Existential
human rights are to be protected by reasonable and appropriate measures
under all circumstances, bearing in mind countervailing human rights. In
addition, the state has human rights obligations to protect the individual
from non-state abuses of power, wherever access to public or tangible social
goods is concerned and there is a disproportionate power relationship between the competing non-state actors.
However, the current system suffers from one grave weakness. It is
based on the premise that states are strong enough to check the range of
agents that form part of the machinery of government, and that they can
fulfill all their protective duties. If we are really experiencing a power shift
away from the state and toward the non-state realm, this foundational premise becomes shaky. At the same time, as state capability to protect is
weakening, their ambit of protective obligations to protect is widening,
since the non-state sector expands into former state domains. The obvious
answer would be to supplement the existing framework of vertical and diagonal human rights obligations with horizontal obligations for those nonstate actors that seem to accumulate power, most prominently transnational
corporations. The emerging duty for non-state actors not to become complicit in human rights violations of states is a first step in the right direction.

